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Abstract
Riots, murders, lynchings and other forms of local violence are costly to security
forces and society at large. Identifying risk factors and forecasting where local violence
is most likely to occur should help allocate scarce peacekeeping and policing resources.
Most forecasting exercises of this kind rely on structural or event data, but these have
many limitations in the poorest and most war-torn states, where the need for prediction
is arguably most urgent. We adopt an alternative approach, applying machine learning
techniques to original panel survey data from Liberia to predict collective, interpersonal
and extrajudicial violence two years into the future. We first train our models to
predict 2010 local violence using 2008 risk factors, then generate forecasts for 2012
before collecting new data. Our models achieve out-of-sample AUCs ranging from 0.65
to 0.74, depending on our specification of the dependent variable. The models also
draw our attention to risk factors different from those typically emphasized in studies
aimed at causal inference alone. For example, we find that while ethnic heterogeneity
and polarization are reliable predictors of local violence, adverse economic shocks are
not. Surprisingly, we also find that the risk of local violence is higher rather than
lower in communities where minority and majority ethnic groups share power. These
counterintuitive results illustrate the usefulness of prediction for generating new stylized
facts for future research to explain. Ours is one of just two attempts to forecast local
violence using survey data, and we conclude by discussing how our approach can be
replicated and extended as similar datasets proliferate.
Introduction
Riots, murders, lynchings and other forms of local violence are an urgent concern for police
and peacekeepers, especially in weak and war-torn states. Local violence is more common,
and possibly even more costly, than war- or terrorism-related violence (?). Local violence
can also shape, and be shaped by, national conflict dynamics (?). Resources for prevention
are often scarce, and any information that helps identify risk factors and predict where
local violence is most likely to occur should have large practical and, potentially, theoretical
returns.
Many studies have attempted to predict national-level conflicts—e.g. civil war, political
instability (?) or “irregular regime change” (?).1 Recently, however, the most active fron-
tier of conflict research has focused on local-level incidents, including murders (?), riots (?),
domestic violence (?), “low-intensity” sectarian clashes (?), conflicts between states and “ex-
cluded, downgraded and underrepresented groups” (?), and killings of suspected witches (?).
Like its cross-national counterpart, most sub-national conflict research has been descriptive
or causal. Forecasting has been relatively rare.
We complement and extend this literature by combining original survey data from Liberia
with existing machine learning techniques to test the feasibility of predicting violence at a
lower unit of analysis (the town or village level) than is typically feasible in exercises of this
kind. In the process we gauge the relative predictive power of 56 potential risk factors for
local violence, identifying relationships that might be used to validate and refine existing
theoretical models of conflict, or to suggest new puzzles and stylized facts for future research
to assess.
Our dataset covers 242 towns and villages in Liberia in 2008, 2010 and 2012. We used
surveys of both residents and leaders to measure three categories of local violence (collective,
interpersonal, and extrajudicial) as well as dozens of demographic, social, political and eco-
nomic predictors. We then used the 2008 data to predict local violence in 2010, simulating
1For a literature review see ?.
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forecasts using cross-validation. We relied on three common machine learning techniques in
particular: lasso, random forests and neural networks. We also included logit for purposes
of comparison. Finally, we locked in the parameters of our models, generated forecasts for
2012, and collected new data to compare our predictions to reality.
We highlight two sets of findings. First, our models perform considerably better than
chance and are robust to changes in specification. This is especially true of lasso, our most
parsimonious model. The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is
between 0.65 and 0.73 for the 2012 lasso forecast, depending on our coding of the dependent
variable. Given the novelty of this exercise, we view these results as a promising first step.
Moreover, the lasso model includes just 5 of our 56 risk factors, some of which are either
slow-moving (e.g. ethnic heterogeneity) or time-invariant (e.g. land lost during the Liberian
civil war). While we cannot be sure that these risk factors will continue to predict violence
in the future, our results raise the possibility of updating the model’s forecasts at relatively
low cost in terms of new data collection. (One finds similar parsimony in some cross-national
models, e.g. ?.)
Second, the models draw our attention to risk factors different from those typically em-
phasized in studies aimed at causal inference alone. Many of these studies focus on the
relationship between local (or national) violence and adverse economic shocks, and existing
evidence suggests a strong causal relationship between shocks and crime (?), witch killings
(?) and domestic violence (?), among other outcomes (see ? for a review). Yet we find that
shocks such as droughts, floods and pest infestations have little predictive power, at least in
our sample. As others have noted (?), statistically significant causes of conflict often prove
weak or unreliable predictors. Forecasting can help focus our attention on substantively
as well as statistically significant risk factors—those that not only cause conflict, but also
predict it.
Some of these risk factors are intuitive. For example, variables related to land loss or
ethnic heterogeneity, polarization and fractionalization consistently predict local violence in
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our sample—an unsurprising result given that Liberia remains divided along ethnic lines,
and given that disputes over property rights are common and prone to escalation, especially
in rural areas (?). Other results are more unexpected. Perhaps most striking, the best pre-
dictor of local violence in our most reliable model (lasso) is an indicator for communities in
which minority and majority ethnic groups share power. Counterintuitively, power-sharing
predicts higher rather than lower levels of local violence. While this correlation is not evi-
dence of causality, it is consistent with recent studies warning of the unintended consequences
of power-sharing (e.g. ?). We discuss possible interpretations and implications of this find-
ing for future research, and include additional results and robustness checks in the online
appendix, available at [URL].
As with any single case study, we cannot be sure how our results will generalize. Our goal
is to be more foundational. To our knowledge, ours is one of just two studies that use survey
data to forecast conflict (the other being ?). Most researchers use either structural or event
data instead (or, increasingly, some combination of the two, e.g. ???). Unfortunately, these
data are scarce or unreliable in weak and war-torn states, where the urgency of forecasting is
arguably greatest, but where journalists and NGOs—the sources typically used to populate
datasets of this kind—are often confined to large, relatively urban areas.
Our survey covers regions of Liberia that are systematically underrepresented in struc-
tural and event datasets. It also captures a wider range of incidents at a lower level of
aggregation and with higher reliability that most event datasets, as we are able to “ground
truth” our quantitative data through qualitative follow-up. Moreover, the survey features
a large number of theoretically- and contextually-relevant predictors that are typically un-
available at this unit of analysis,2 measured using questions that were extensively pretested
for appropriateness and comprehensibility.
Of course, our dataset is not without limitations. The most obvious is the relatively
small number of communities (242) and time periods (three) that it covers; another is the
2Though innovation in passive measurement should make data collection at this level increasingly reliable,
even cross-nationally; see, e.g., ? in this volume.
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potential for misreporting of the dependent variable (even with qualitative follow-up), and
for sampling error in our risk factors. While we address these issues below and in the
online appendix, replication is needed in more settings, ideally at higher frequency in larger
and longer panels. Fortunately, as datasets on local violence and its correlates continue to
proliferate, opportunities for replication will proliferate as well. Leveraging these datasets
for purposes of forecasting is a promising frontier, not just to facilitate conflict prevention
and mitigation but also to identify theoretically interesting patterns for future research to
explore.
Setting
Liberia is a small West African nation still recovering from two civil wars fought between
1989 and 2003. Four features of the setting are especially relevant to this study.
First, in many respects Liberia stabilized over the study period, 2008-12. It held reason-
ably free, competitive elections in 2005 and 2011, which brought to power a largely legitimate
and professional regime. The state has been supported by ample aid and a large United Na-
tions (UN) peacekeeping operation. Second, despite that stability, ethnic and religious cleav-
ages remain deep. Liberia is home to fifteen indigenous ethnic groups (or âĂĲtribesâĂİ) as
well as an Americo-Liberian elite that has historically held political power. Tensions between
these groups are often implicated in incidents of local violence.
Third, while the prevalence of local violence declined over the years of the study (see the
online appendix), it remains endemic. In 2010 alone, 10% of the towns in our sample reported
a violent strike or protest or a violent confrontation between tribes; 15% reported a murder
or rape; and 9% reported a lynching or trial by ordeal. Fourth and finally, the Liberian
government’s ability to prevent or mitigate these incidents is limited: the courts remain
largely inaccessible, and the army and police are underfunded and ill-equipped. Meanwhile,
the UN Mission in Liberia officially concluded its mandate in this year, and the country
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is struggling to restore economic growth after the devastating Ebola epidemic of 2014-15.
This has increased the urgency of creating early warning systems to anticipate local violence
before it occurs, and to prevent peaceful disputes from escalating into violent ones.
Data and measurement
We collected survey data from residents and leaders in 242 communities across three of
LiberiaâĂŹs 15 counties: Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh. Our unit of analysis is the smallest
administrative unit in the country, whose size typically ranges from a few hundred to a
few thousand residents. Most are villages or small towns. Fifty are neighborhoods, called
“quarters,” within larger towns, with their own quarter chiefs. For simplicity, we refer to
all of these settlements as “towns.” See the online appendix for maps and further details on
sampling.
The first round of data was collected as part of randomized controlled trial evaluating a
UNHCR-sponsored alternative dispute resolution program (?), and the towns in our sample
are not representative of the three counties. Rather, they were selected because government
officials believed them to be especially prone to disputes. Comparison to a nationally rep-
resentative survey conducted at the same time suggests the towns in our sample were not,
in fact, much more conflicted than the average Liberian community in these three counties,
or nationwide (?). Nonetheless, we interpret our results as conditional on some minimum
pre-existing level of risk.
In each town we surveyed a representative sample of roughly 20 randomly-selected res-
idents and four purposively-selected leaders—typically a town chief, women’s group leader,
youth group leader, and minority ethnic group leader. We collected data in three rounds:
March to April 2009, November 2010 to January 2011, and February to April 2013. We
selected a new cross-section of residents each time, aggregating individual-level responses
into town-level variables to construct a panel.
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Dependent variable
We coded our dependent variable using the leaders survey, focusing on seven types of local
violence in three categories:
Collective violence includes violent strikes or protests and violent confrontations between
tribes. Strikes and protests are common forms of collective action in rural Liberia; not all
turn violent, but some result in property destruction, fights or lynchings. If weapons are
involved, they tend to be limited to sticks or machetes. Common proximate causes include
ambiguities in property rights, elders’ restrictions on youths, violations of ethnic or religious
customs, and disagreements over political decisions or institutions.
Interpersonal violence includes murders, rapes and assaults with weapons (i.e. aggra-
vated assault). Many of these crimes begin as disputes between families, or between men
over a woman. Killings over land also occur, though with less frequency. Murders can also
include cases of manslaughter where foul play is unproven but suspected.
Extrajudicial violence includes trial by ordeal and beatings or killings of suspected
witches. Trial by ordeal is an informal mechanism of criminal adjudication or dispute resolu-
tion. While efficient (?), it is usually coercive and almost always illegal. The most common
forms of trial by ordeal are “hot cutlass,” whereby suspects are made to withstand a heated
machete pressed against their skin, and “sassywood,” whereby suspects are made to eat the
bark of the poisonous sassywood tree (or ingest some other potion). Mobs sometimes beat
or kill the accused, especially in cases of witchcraft.
Coding
Enumerators asked each of four leaders whether each of the seven types of local violence
described above occurred in their community in the past 12 months. We then used the
modal response across the four leaders to code an indicator for each type of local violence
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before aggregating by category (collective, interpersonal and extrajudicial) and overall (i.e.
any local violence). This is a conservative coding rule: if different leaders classify the same
event in different ways, it is possible that no incident will be recorded. We report descriptive
statistics based on this coding rule in the online appendix, and examine alternatives below.
Validation
We validated our coding in 2010 and 2012 through qualitative follow-up. In 2012, enumera-
tors recorded and transcribed leaders’ accounts of all incidents of all types while conducting
the survey. In 2010, enumerators returned to towns that reported at least one incident of
collective violence a few months after the survey to investigate further. For simplicity and
consistency, we do not recode our dependent variable based on qualitative follow-up for most
of our analyses; rather, we use leaders’ accounts to validate our approach to aggregation,
and to better understand the dynamics of local violence in our sample. We do, however, test
the robustness of our results to alternate coding rules. The online appendix discusses the
qualitative follow-up in more detail.
Advantages and disadvantages of the data and coding
Most conflict forecasters use structural data, event data, or some combination of the two.
Surveys allow us to capture incidents that these datasets generally do not, and to validate
them through qualitative follow-up.3 Moreover, many event datasets do not include geolo-
cation below the country (or, at best, district) level, precluding local prediction. Those that
do tend to rely on newspaper or NGO reports, which are often incomplete and biased, es-
pecially in the poorest and most war-torn countries, where media coverage is usually spotty
and NGOs are often confined to capital cities and other large, relatively urban areas. Sur-
vey data also allows us to capture a wide variety of theoretically- and contextually-relevant
3? and ? both stress that there are probably more incidents missing than present in event datasets,
including ICEWS and GDELT, though comprehensiveness will likely improve over time. We discuss these
advantages and disadvantages in detail in the online appendix.
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predictors using extensively pretested questions.
Our approach has at least three limitations, however, which could cause either under-
or over-reporting of local violence. First, we focus on a non-random sample of towns from
a non-random sample of Liberian counties. These communities were purposively selected
because they were believed to be at disproportionately high risk of conflict. This is dis-
advantageous in that it limits the generalizability of our results, but it is also potentially
advantageous in that it focuses our attention on the areas of most immediate concern to
police and peacekeepers. This is similar in spirit to cross-national models that focus on
particularly “high-risk” regions—e.g. sub-Saharan Africa—or that drop or separately model
countries believed to be “immune” from conflict (?). Furthermore, comparison to a nation-
ally representative survey suggests that our towns were not much more conflicted than the
average Liberian community (?). Even in our sample, the actual prevalence of violence re-
ported in the survey was far from uniform, alleviating potential concerns about selection on
the dependent variable. Finally, while most of our towns are small and rural, the sample also
includes quarters of several larger cities, including Voinjama (the 6th largest city in Liberia)
and Zwedru (the 8th largest).
Second, categorization of local violence was more ambiguous than we expected. In a set-
ting like Liberia, a murder can provoke accusations of witchcraft, which can incite collective
violence, which different leaders may interpret in different ways (e.g. as a violent confronta-
tion between tribes, or as a violent strike or protest). We are not the first to note this
ambiguity (see, e.g., ?), which aﬄicts any approach to coding conflict, survey- or news-based
or otherwise. Ambiguity motivates our decision to aggregate multiple categories of violence
into a single indicator, and also motivates our exploration of alternative coding rules below.
Third and relatedly, leaders may disagree on what does and doesn’t constitute “violence.”
For example, in our qualitative follow-up, leaders described two of the seven violent strikes
or protests recorded in the 2012 survey in ways that suggested they may have been non-
violent; a third incident was more ambiguous. Three of the 16 trials by ordeal may have
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been conducted semi-voluntarily, though they were still illegal, and still involved the threat
of death or injury. And one of the five murders in 2012 appears to have been a case of
manslaughter, though neither we nor the leaders know for sure. As we discuss below and
in the online appendix, performance either improves or remains the same when we use
alternative coding rules to correct for possible over- or under-reporting.
Predictors
We trained our models using 56 potential risk (and protective) factors for local violence,
organized into the following categories:
Demographics includes estimates for the per capita population of men, youths, ex-combatants,
foreigners and returned internally displaced persons (IDPs) in each town. Conventional
wisdom has long portrayed young men, and especially ex-combatants, as the most likely
participants in crime and collective violence (?). Conflict between “locals” and perceived
“foreigners” (including returned IDPs and refugees) is common across sub-Saharan Africa
(?), and has been a recurring source of instability in the counties we study.
Social capital and civic life includes proxies for membership in civil society organiza-
tions, contributions to public goods and expressions of self-reliance in social service provision.
Social capital and civic life have been posited as protective factors against crime (?) and
collective (especially ethnic) violence (?).
Quality of governance includes residents’ perceptions of corruption in the state security
and justice sectors, and of fairness and impartiality among the leaders of their towns. A
large literature has found a positive correlation between grievances and collective violence
(see ? for a review); extrajudicial violence may also be more common where citizens distrust
the police and courts (?).
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Accessibility and social services includes an indicator for cell phone coverage, an index
of facilities available in each town (e.g. wells, latrines, schools and clinics) and an estimate of
the distance from each town to the nearest usable road. Accessibility increases the likelihood
of public goods provision, and of third party intervention to prevent or mitigate violence.
We include estimates for the frequency of police patrols and visits from NGO personnel as
well.
Natural resources includes indicators for any rubber plantations or diamond, gold or
iron mines within an hour’s walk of each town. Cross-national studies have found a posi-
tive correlation between natural resources and the onset and duration of civil conflict (?),
though it is unclear whether the mechanisms underlying this relationship manifest at the
sub-national level as well. Even if they do not, proximity to natural resources may attract
transient and potentially disruptive populations—ex-combatants, for example (?)—as well
as multinational corporations, whose presence may provoke conflict with communities.
Ethnic heterogeneity, fractionalization and polarization includes estimates for the
number of tribes cohabiting in each town; the proportion of residents belonging to the
majority tribe in each town; and the proportion of residents expressing prejudice against
other tribes (e.g. the belief that other tribes are “violent” or “dirty”). Ethnic fractionalization
and polarization have long been viewed as risk factors for both local (e.g. ?) and national
violence (e.g. ?), especially in the absence of strong state institutions. Cross-national studies
have similarly found a correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and violent crime (?).
Employment, wealth and inequality includes an indicator for employment, an addi-
tive index of asset ownership, and an estimate for the variation in asset ownership across
individuals within the same town (a proxy for inequality). While hotly debated, scholars
have long argued that unemployment, poverty and inequality tend to correlate with crime
and collective violence (see ? and ? for reviews), as well as with persecution of accused
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witches (?), among other outcomes.
Access to land includes estimates for the proportion of residents reporting an ongoing
land dispute, the proportion of residents without access to land, and the proportion of
residents who lost their land during the Liberian civil war. Access to land is a recurring
driver of conflict across sub-Saharan Africa in general (?), and in Liberia specifically (?).
Adverse economic shocks includes estimates for the proportion of residents affected by
crop failures (due to droughts, floods or pest infestations) or human or livestock diseases.
Previous studies have found a causal effect of shocks of this sort on crime (?), domestic
violence (?) and witch killings (?), among other outcomes (see ? for a review). More recent
research has focused on testing the predictive power of climate change more generally (e.g.
? in this volume).
History of violence includes estimates for the proportion of residents that witnessed,
participated in or were victims of violence during the Liberian civil war, and the proportion of
residents that fled their homes. Intuitively, we might expect exposure to wartime violence to
exacerbate the risk of peacetime violence, though recent studies have found that experiences
of victimization may have counterintuitive salutary effects on cooperation, altruism and civic
life (see ? for a review). Finally, we also include a lagged dependent variable in all models,
as well as estimates for the proportion of residents reporting a burglary, robbery or simple
assault in the previous year.
The online appendix provides descriptive statistics for all of the risk factors listed above.
Methods
Statisticians have developed a wide variety of tools for forecasting. We focus on three
in particular: lasso, random forests and neural networks. These techniques have proven
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track records, and—consistent with our inductive approach—can accommodate many highly
collinear regressors and non-linear or interactive relationships simultaneously. They also
capture much of the variation across existing classes of machine learning models: selection
and shrinkage techniques (lasso), ensemble and tree-based methods (random forests), and
non-linear adaptive weighting algorithms (neural networks). For purposes of comparison, we
include results from a logit model as well.
We describe our models briefly here, with additional details in the online appendix.
Models
Least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (lasso) is among the most widely-
used variable selection techniques in statistics (?). It is analogous to logit, with the crucial
difference that it penalizes model complexity, shrinking all coefficients and reducing some
to zero. It thus discards predictors automatically, using a transparent, replicable selection
mechanism. Lasso models also tend to be parsimonious, which is advantageous for avoiding
multicollinearity and preventing over-fitting—problems that often aﬄict logit models, espe-
cially when the number of predictors is large and the dependent variable is rare—as well as
for the more practical purpose of deciding which risk factors to track over time.
Random forests are collections of decision trees (?). A decision tree sorts observations
into subgroups, or “nodes,” by first identifying the risk factor that most accurately dis-
tinguishes positives (in our case, violence) from negatives (no violence), then identifying
secondary and tertiary risk factors to further reduce mean-squared error within each node.
Each observation is passed down the tree until it reaches a terminal node, at which point a
prediction is made based on the modal predicted outcome at that node. Random forests are
simply ensembles of decision trees grown within many random subsamples of the data using
many random subsets of predictors.4 The forest’s prediction is the average prediction across
4In our case, each tree is fit to 24 randomly-selected observations (roughly 10% of the sample) using 7
randomly-selected predictors and a maximum of five terminal nodes. Each random forest is composed of
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every tree, increasing stability.
Neural networks were inspired by the structure of the human brain, and have been
applied (albeit sparingly) in political science in the past (e.g. ?). They make no parametric
assumptions, instead using an iterative algorithm to approximate the underlying structure
of the data. The algorithm begins by constructing different nonlinear weighted sums of
the available predictors, each called a node. It then uses that layer of weighted sums to
generate another weighted sum, which maps onto the prediction space. In principle there
can be many layers and nodes, but our model is more parsimonious, with one layer and 5
nodes. The weights are initially chosen at random, and then tuned iteratively to minimize
mean-squared error.
Logit has the virtue of simplicity and familiarity, but has potential drawbacks for our
purposes. While lasso, random forests and neural networks can accommodate many highly
collinear predictors simultaneously, logit generally cannot, and the statistical consequences of
attempting to do so can be severe. Unlike lasso, logit provides no systematic or transparent
mechanism for pruning risk factors. Unlike random forests and neural networks, while logit
in principle allows an unlimited number of non-linearities and interactions, in practice it
quickly becomes overdetermined, especially when the dependent variable is rare.
Spatial autocorrelation
One common concern in regression-based models of conflict is spatial autocorrelation—i.e.
the tendency for incidents to “cluster” within particular geographical areas. As we show in
the online appendix, local violence in our communities does exhibit some clustering within
counties. We also show, however, that proximity to towns that report incidents of local
violence in the past is a poor predictor of new incidents in the future, and that including a
1,000 trees constructed in this manner. For a given observation, the algorithm generates a “final” forecast
by taking the average of these 1,000 predictions.
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spatial lag does not noticeably change the performance of our models.5 We conclude that
incorporating spatial spillover may improve predictive performance, but probably not by
much.
Cross-validated forecasts
We trained our models and simulated a forecast through 5-fold cross-validation, using 2008
risk factors to predict local violence in 2010. Cross-validation has been shown to approximate
out-of-sample accuracy and is widely used to evaluate model performance without new data
(?). We proceeded in four steps. First, we randomly partitioned our sample into five equally
sized subsets, each of which contained data on both 2008 risk factors and 2010 local violence.
Second, we trained our models on four of the subsets and generated predictions for the
fifth, reshuﬄing until we had a prediction for each observation based on a model that was
not fit to that observation. We standardized all predictors to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation.6 Third, because a single cross-validation can yield idiosyncratic results,
we repeated this process 200 times for each model. Finally, we identified optimal model
parameters across the 200 trials, applied them to another 200 trials, and estimated average
model performance. We call these within-sample tests our “cross-validated forecasts.”
True forecasts
We then applied the optimal parameters from the cross-validated forecasts to the 2010 risk
factors to generate predicted probabilities of violence in 2012. We published these forecasts
online prior to 2012 data collection (?).7 Afterwards we made only minor changes, described
in the online appendix. We call these out-of-sample tests our “true forecasts.”
These tests set a high bar, as Liberia was (and is) a country in flux. Between 2010 and
5The only exception appears to be the “true forecast” AUC on the neural networks model, though even
here the Brier score remains unchanged.
6Some predictors are skewed. We show robustness to non-linear transformations in the online appendix.
7This earlier version of the article can be downloaded at http://cu-csds.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/11/BBH_CAPERS.pdf
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2012, thousands of refugees returned to Liberia from neighboring countries; large numbers
of police officers were deployed to rural areas for the first time; the UN withdrew several
contingents of peacekeepers; and a presidential election was held. We sought to determine
whether our models would perform well despite these changes.
Evaluating model performance
Forecasting involves a trade-off between sensitivity (true positive rate) and specificity (true
negative rate). For continuous predictions, this trade-off is regulated by the threshold above
which we predict our dependent variable will occur; in general, the higher the threshold,
the lower the true positive rate, and vice versa. A ROC curve plots this trade-off over
the entire range of possible thresholds. We plot ROC curves for each of our models, and
also estimate the corresponding area under the curve (AUC), which captures each model’s
overall predictive power relative to chance; the higher the AUC, the better the model. We
also include the Brier score, computed as the average squared deviation of each predicted
probability from the true observed value of the dependent variable (0 or 1). The lower the
Brier score, the better the model. For the cross-validated forecasts, we average both the
AUC and the Brier score across the 200 trials.
While AUCs and Brier scores are useful benchmarks, they can be misleading because
they weight false positives and false negatives equally. This may be sensible in some appli-
cations, but less so in others. For example, local violence may be sufficiently costly that a
policymaker would be willing to tolerate many more false positives for the sake of fewer false
negatives. We therefore also provide performance metrics at the point on the ROC curve that
maximizes sensitivity while maintaining accuracy of at least 50% within each cross-validated
trial. (Because performance varies across the 200 trials, not all models achieve an accuracy
rate of 50% or higher on average after applying a single set of optimal model parameters.)
This choice is principally a discursive device, however, capturing what we believe to be a
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sensible trade-off between sensitivity and specificity.8
Results
We focus on forecasting our aggregate dependent variable, which takes a 1 for any town in
which leaders reported any incident of collective, interpersonal or extrajudicial violence in
the past year. We focus on this coding of the dependent variable for two reasons. First,
as noted above, our qualitative investigation revealed that a single incident of local violence
could easily be classified in multiple ways. Second, aggregation makes rare events less rare,
reducing the risk of overfitting and increasing the stability of our results. This is especially
important in cross-validation, which requires splitting the data into subsets. Many cross-
national models aggregate for similar reasons, e.g. by combining multiple events into a
single indicator for âĂĲpolitical instabilityâĂİ (?) or “adverse regime change” (?). We
discuss forecasts of our disaggregated dependent variables below and in the online appendix,
though these results are unstable and should be interpreted with caution.
Cross-validated forecasts
Figure ?? plots the ROC curve for each cross-validated forecast of 2010 local violence using
2008 risk factors. The solid circles indicate the thresholds that maximize sensitivity while
maintaining accuracy at or above 50%. Moving left on the ROC from each solid circle reduces
the number of towns in which we predict local violence will occur, lowering sensitivity but
increasing specificity and (in some cases) accuracy. This would be appropriate, from a policy
perspective, if it were difficult or costly to expend resources on prevention. (Incidentally,
the solid circles correspond to the points of maximum distance from the diagonal for both
lasso and neural networks. This suggests that further improvements in sensitivity beyond our
8By way of comparison, ? opt for the threshold that equalizes sensitivity and specificity, weighting false
positives and false negatives equally. Note that the surest way to increase accuracy would be to predict peace
in every town. This approach would achieve sensitivity of 0%, specificity of 100%, and overall accuracy of
83% in both 2010 and 2012.
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Figure 1: ROC curves for cross-validated forecasts of 2010 local violence using 2008 risk
factors
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preferred threshold would have required increasingly large penalties in terms of specificity and
accuracy.) In addition to the AUC and Brier score, Table ?? reports five performance metrics
at the thresholds indicated by the solid circles in Figure ??. We also report the standard
deviation of these metrics over the 200 cross-validations. Finally, as a benchmark we report
results from a “recurrence” model in which we predict local violence in 2010 wherever it
occurred in 2008.
While none of our models performs especially well in cross-validation, lasso exceeds the
alternatives. It achieves the highest AUC overall—0.58, compared to 0.53 or less for the other
models—and also outperforms the alternatives at virtually every threshold on the ROC curve
(though these differences are not always statistically significant). It also achieves the lowest
Brier score. Lasso’s performance is especially noteworthy given its parsimony: as we will
see in Section ??, it relies on just five of our 56 risk factors. Random forests is in a sense
parsimonious as well, in that it assigns importance scores of near zero to most predictors.
Lasso outperforms at our preferred threshold as well, achieving a true positive rate of 77%
and an accuracy rate of 47% overall. The former is considerably higher than the sensitivity
rates achieved by the other models, while the latter is only slightly lower than the other
models’ accuracy rates. High sensitivity comes at the cost of a high ratio of false to true
positives, however, which reflects our intuition that false negatives are far costlier than false
positives, and that policymakers might be willing to tolerate more of the former for less of
the latter. (The threshold can, of course, be adjusted to accommodate different preferences.)
At our preferred threshold, lasso achieves high sensitivity without sacrificing much in the
way of accuracy relative to the other methods (though its specificity is lower—a result of
over-predicting violence). The standard deviations on these metrics are small, suggesting the
results are relatively stable over cross-validations. They are also robust to most modeling
choices (see the online appendix).
Nor are the results driven by serial autocorrelation alone, as the lagged dependent variable
predicts less than half of 2010 local violence, with a true positive rate of just 48%. More
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important, as we will see, the lagged dependent variable does not appear among the top 10
predictors for any model. While local violence is thus to some extent autoregressive, there
is room for improvement with the inclusion of additional risk factors. It is possible that the
degree of serial autocorrelation would increase in a longer panel, or that further lags of the
dependent variable would improve performance and displace other covariates. We cannot
say.
These results do not imply that lasso is superior to random forests, neural networks or
logit in any universal sense. The standard deviations on the AUCs appear to overlap, and
further optimization may have improved the performance of the other models. For example,
dropping a subset of poorly-performing predictors before running the cross-validated fore-
casts tends to increase the sensitivity of the random forests and neural networks models to
levels similar to lasso (see the online appendix). Nonetheless, given the relatively small num-
ber of towns and time periods and the relatively large number of predictors, lasso’s approach
to variable selection appears to be advantageous.
True forecasts
Figure ?? plots ROC curves for our “true forecasts” of 2012 local violence using 2010 risk
factors. Table ?? reports the AUC and Brier score for each model, as well as five performance
metrics at our preferred threshold. Standard errors for the AUC are estimated via stratified
bootstrapping.
All of our models achieve higher AUCs and lower Brier scores in the true forecasts than in
cross-validation. They also achieve higher sensitivity at our preferred threshold. Moreover,
lasso no longer dominates the other models. It still outperforms random forests and neural
networks in terms of both AUC and Brier score, but the random forests and neural networks
ROCs cross the lasso ROC at the lower and upper ends of the distribution, suggesting that
lasso’s dominance depends on the threshold above which we predict violence will occur.
Despite logit’s poor performance in cross-validation, it now outperforms lasso in terms of
20
Figure 2: ROC curves for true forecasts of 2012 violence using 2010 risk factors
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AUC, though lasso continues to outperform in terms of Brier score. In general, each model’s
AUC and Brier score are robust to modeling choices, but specificity and sensitivity at our
preferred threshold vary considerably, especially for random forests and neural networks (see
the online appendix).
Alternative coding rules and model specifications
Here we briefly consider four alternative coding rules and model specifications, and include
figures, tables and robustness checks in the online appendix.
Using a less conservative coding rule
In our analyses above we use a conservative coding rule for our dependent variable, potentially
undercounting local violence if different leaders disagree about the appropriate categorization
of the same event. As a less conservative alternative, we code the dependent variables as
a 1 if at least two leaders reported any incident of any type in the past year (even if their
categorizations of the incident were different). This increases the prevalence of local violence
in the sample—from 37% to 40% in 2008; from 17% to 27% in 2010; and from 17% to 20% in
2012—and improves model performance significantly. AUCs increase by 6 to 9 points, to a
high of 0.67 for the cross-validated forecasts (lasso) and 0.74 for the true forecasts (random
forests, though lasso’s AUC is only slightly worse at 0.73). Lasso and random forests are the
best performers overall; logit is the worst.
Dropping ambiguous incidents
In our analyses above we do not correct the coding of potentially non-violent incidents. Our
qualitative follow-up revealed seven such incidents, but the performance of our models is
virtually unchanged if we recode these as 0s.
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Disaggregating incidents by category
In the online appendix we reproduce our cross-validated and true forecasts with the depen-
dent variable disaggregated into its three component parts: collective, interpersonal and ex-
trajudicial violence. Model performance varies across time periods and dependent variables,
and no model unambiguously dominates the others. As mentioned above, disaggregating in
this way makes the dependent variable rarer, increasing the risk of over-fitting9 and reducing
the stability of the results, which should thus be interpreted caution.
Averaging across models
Finally, recent research suggests that aggregating forecasts across multiple models can yield
more accurate results (e.g. ?). We consider several approaches to aggregation in the online
appendix. Overall, the performance of these models is similar or marginally superior to that
of our best-performing models above.
Identifying the most reliable predictors of local violence
Identifying the most reliable predictors of local violence may be equally if not more informa-
tive than predicting where it is most likely to occur. Table ?? ranks our 56 risk factors by
(1) the absolute value of their coefficients in the lasso model and (2) their importance scores
in the random forests model, where “importance” is calculated as the average decrease in
mean squared error achieved by the addition of each predictor to the model. Because neural
network weights cannot be meaningfully ranked in this way, and because of the limitations
of logit discussed above, we focus on lasso and random forests alone. A comparison to logit,
and a list of all 56 risk factors and their corresponding coefficients, is provided in the online
appendix.
We observe some model dependence in the rankings, which is unsurprising given that
9For example, while the lasso model relies on just five risk factors to predict the aggregate dependent
variable, it uses dozens of risk factors to predict each of the disaggregated categories.
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lasso tends to favor uncorrelated regressors while random forests tends to favor correlated
ones. Nonetheless, the highest ranked predictors do seem to capture some similar town
characteristics across models. Some of these patterns are intuitive. For example, given that
our dependent variable is binary, the correlation between violence and town population may
be mechanical: more people means more potential disputants, and therefore more potential
violence. Other patterns are consistent with existing theories about local violence in general,
and about Liberia specifically. For example, four of the top 10 predictors—“minority tribe in
town leadership,” “% believing other tribes are violent,” “% in dominant group” and “number
of tribes in town”—are related to ethnic heterogeneity, polarization and fractionalization.
This is unsurprising given that Liberia remains divided along ethnic lines. An estimate for
the proportion of residents reporting land loss is among the top predictors in random forests
(though not in lasso) as well, which is unsurprising given that disputes over property rights
are a persistent source of tension in rural Liberia (and across sub-Saharan Africa), and that
many of these disputes revolve around land lost in the civil war.
Other results are more unexpected. For example, while risk factors related to wealth
and inequality are highly ranked in the random forests model (though again not in lasso),
adverse economic shocks—droughts, floods, pest infestations and diseases—are not. This is
striking given the number of studies focused on estimating the impact of shocks on violence
of various kinds (see ? for a review). Also unexpected is the absence of the lagged dependent
variable from the top 10 predictors for either model. This is especially relevant from a policy
perspective. In settings where information about violence is limited or unreliable, police,
peacekeepers and NGOs may use past incidents as heuristics for allocating scarce resources
in future. The absence of the lagged dependent variable from Table ?? reveals the potential
limitations of this approach (though serial autocorrelation may play more of a role in a longer
panel, and we do find some evidence of serial autocorrelation even here).
Perhaps most striking is the relationship in the lasso model between violence and an in-
dicator for whether or not majority and minority tribes share political power. This indicator
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is the most reliable predictor in our most reliable model, with a coefficient twice as large as
the second highest-ranked righthand-side variable. (Power-sharing appears among the top
ten random forests predictors as well, but is lower ranked.) Yet, counterintuitively, the co-
efficient is positive, meaning that power-sharing heightens rather than reduces the predicted
probability that local violence will occur. We return to this result in the discussion and
conclusions below.
Identifying the most reliable predictors after disaggregating incidents by cate-
gory
Of course, different categories of local violence may have different predictors. In the online
appendix we replicate the analysis in Table ?? for each of our three categories: collective,
interpersonal and extrajudicial. Caution is warranted when interpreting these results, since
the appropriate categorization of incidents is often ambiguous, and since the top risk factors
vary dramatically across cross-validated trials—a result of an increasingly rare dependent
variable. With these caveats in mind, our results suggest that, in general, different categories
of violence do indeed have different predictors, though some recur.
Discussion and conclusions
Overall, our results suggest that prospects for leveraging survey data to forecast local vio-
lence are promising. We find that a relatively simple, parsimonious model (lasso) outper-
forms most alternatives, and predicts local violence reasonably accurately using few risk
factors, especially when we apply a less conservative coding rule to our dependent variable.
Lasso’s parsimony, and its reliance on several risk factors that are either slow-moving or time-
invariant, suggests that future models may achieve similar or superior results at lower cost in
terms of new data collection, though this proposition awaits further testing.10 Fortunately,
10One important open question in Liberia is whether our models will continue to perform well in the wake
of the Ebola epidemic—a far more destabilizing event than any that occurred during our study period.
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the continued proliferation of survey-based datasets on local violence and its correlates offers
many opportunities for replication. Where datasets are limited or non-existent, or where the
cost of conducting surveys is prohibitively expensive, cell phone polls or web-scraping may
serve as substitutes. Administrative data compiled by police and peacekeepers—e.g. arrest
records and criminal complaints—can further complement these efforts.
Even when we relax our coding rule for the dependent variable, however, the AUCs of
our micro-level models, which never exceed 0.74, still underperform many of their macro-
level counterparts. What might explain this disparity? One possibility is that the outcomes
we study—riots, murders, lynchings—are inherently more difficult to predict than, say, civil
wars or battles between armed groups. Another is that the slow-moving “structural” variables
that we measure in the survey need to be combined with faster-moving “process” variables,
such as changes in leadership or influxes of migrants at the community level. (Indeed, some
cross-national models are moving in this direction; see, e.g., ?, ? or, in this special issue, ?).
Another possibility, discussed above, is that our panel is too short—shorter than those used
in most cross-national studies. Yet another is that we simply failed to measure the optimal
predictors of local violence, and so failed to achieve optimal results. While we were aimed
for comprehensiveness in the variables we measured, oversights were inevitable—there are
only so many questions a survey respondent can answer—and we cannot know how these
gaps may have affected our results. These caveats notwithstanding, given the novelty of the
exercise, we view the performance of our models as a promising first step.
Beyond their potential practical applications, our models generate interesting substan-
tive patterns for future research to explore. Perhaps most notable is the strong positive
correlation between local violence and power-sharing. Previous studies have found that ex-
clusionary institutions foment conflict between dominant and marginalized groups (?), and
that power-sharing helps mitigate the risk of violence (e.g., in this special issue, ?). Others,
however, have warned of the dangers of power-sharing (?) or of cohabitation between equally
dominant ethnic or religious groups (?), and have suggested that violence often accompanies
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minority access to political power (?). Our results are more consistent with these latter
intuitions.
Of course, the correlation we observe is not evidence of causality, and interpretation
remains ambiguous. One possible explanation is that once minority groups gain access to
power, majority groups resort to the use of force to suppress and intimidate them. Another
is that current power-sharing arrangements are responses to past conflicts (?), and that past
conflicts continue to predict future ones. A third is that the correlation is spurious—an
artifact of over-fitting. We view this as unlikely given the strength of the association, and
given that it emerges most strongly in a model with only five predictors. Nonetheless, we
are careful not to generalize too much from this one case, and we are doubly careful not to
imply a relationship of cause and effect. Whatever the nature of the relationship, we believe
it merits further study, especially at the local level.
More generally, we believe our results argue for a more even balance between forecasting
and hypothesis-testing in conflict research. Currently the balance of this literature—and of
comparative politics and international relations more generally—is strongly skewed towards
hypothesis-testing, with relatively few attempts at prediction. At this extreme, the marginal
gains from forecasting are probably large. A myriad of existing micro-level datasets could
be harnessed for purposes of prediction, and new datasets are being constructed every day.
We view this unexplored frontier as one of the disciplineâĂŹs most promising.
Data replication
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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Appendix for online publication
Survey sites
Our unit of analysis was the smallest unit of local administration in Liberia: the village,
town, or (in slightly larger towns) the town quarter. 36 larger towns with quarters are in
the sample, with 5 quarters at the median. For simplicity we refer to these all as “towns”.
In 2008 they had populations of 439 at the 10th percentile, 4,045 at the 90th percentile, and
1,811 at the median.11 Figure ?? below maps them, along with the geographical distribution
of violence in each year of the survey.
There were originally 246 towns in the sample in three counties (a “county” is akin to a state
or province in other countries). We have survey data on 242 of these, as surveyors could not
reach two extremely remote villages for any survey round, one tiny village disbanded before
the first follow-up, and one town is missing data.
The data were collected in the context of a randomized evaluation of a government-sponsored
alternative dispute resolution training intervention, and the towns are not a representative
sample of towns in these counties. Rather, county officials nominated these towns because
they were thought to be more dispute-prone than others. It is difficult to say how this
sampling approach affects our predictions and predictive power. It could improve or reduce
performance. One can imagine that focusing on the subset of places perceived to be most
risky is useful from a policy perspective, and reasonable under budget constraints. Nonethe-
less, one would like to be able to test these assumptions using a representative sample of
towns, or stratified random sample. Unfortunately such a sample is not available in this
case, and is recommended for future research.
No census frame existed at the time of the first round of data collection. To create a represen-
tative sample, a team walked each town and divided it into blocks, chose a random pathway,
counted all houses along that pathway, and randomly chose a set number of households to
survey. Household members were selected randomly. Non-response was typically less than 5
to 10% per town.
Measurement of local violence
Descriptive statistics for local violence
Table ?? reports the prevalence of violence in each survey round. In 2008, 37.2% of towns
reported at least one major incident. By 2010, that proportion roughly halved, to 17.4%.12
11There are 50 town quarters in 36 larger towns. The largest town has 16 quarters, but most have far
fewer—a median of 5.
12At baseline the “fights with weapons” question was less specific, asking only about “serious fights.” This
accounts for some of the decline in fights from 2008 to 2010, but the decline in other categories is similar. If
we omit all fights (with and without weapons) from the aggregate indicator, prevalence rates in 2008, 2010
and 2012 are 29%, 16% and 15%, respectively. Thus the fall from 2008 to 2010 is still precipitous.
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By 2012, however, the rate of decline had slowed, and the proportion of towns experiencing
at least one major incident remained high (16.5%).
Comparison of local violence in our sample relative to a nationally
representative one
Our selection of towns is not representative of Liberia, or of the counties from which they
were sampled. They were identified by government officials and other stakeholders because
they were believed to be at disproportionately high risk of local violence. Nonetheless,
comparison to a nationally representative survey (?) conducted at the same time as our
second wave of data collection suggests that our towns were not much more conflicted than
the average Liberian community, either in these three counties or nationwide.
Since ? do not survey leaders, we cannot directly compare our measures of collective,
interpersonal and extrajudicial violence to theirs. We can, however, compare rates of armed
violence as reported by citizens themselves. 4% of respondents in Vinck et al.’s survey
reported being victims of armed violence in Lofa, 5% in Nimba and 4% in Grand Gedeh,
compared to 7% nationwide. In our survey, 1% of respondents reported being victims of
armed violence in Lofa, 3% in Nimba and 3% in Grand Gedeh. These rates are comparable
across surveys in all counties. Moreover, since our question is more specific than Vinck et
al.’s—we ask about armed robberies and aggravated assaults specifically, while Vinck et al.
ask about any violence involving a weapon—it is likely that our results are underestimates
relative to theirs. Though less directly relevant, rates of robbery and burglary are similar
as well,13 as are complaints of witchcraft—indeed, if anything the latter are less common in
our sample than in Vinck et al.’s14.
13In Vinck et al., 12% of respondents reported a robbery or burglary in Lofa, 11% in Nimba and 18%
in Grand Gedeh, compared to 15% nationwide. In our survey, 14% of respondents reported a robbery or
burglary in Lofa, 25% in Nimba and 13% in Grand Gedeh. Except for Nimba, these rates are comparable
across surveys.
1419% of Vinck et al’s respondents reported being victims of witchcraft in Lofa, 21% in Nimba and 14%
in Grand Gedeh, compared to 17% nationwide. In our survey, 6% of respondents reported being victims of
witchcraft in Lofa, 10% in Nimba and 11% in Grand Gedeh. If anything, complaints of witchcraft appear to
be less common in our sample than in Vinck et al.’s.
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Of course, it is possible that our towns are more conflicted along other dimensions,
including potentially the three dimensions of local violence we attempt to forecast. But it is
not obvious why this would be the case, and we interpret the parallels between our survey
and Vinck et al.’s as evidence that the towns in our sample are not much more conflicted
than the average Liberian community.
Spatial autocorrelation in local violence
Figure ?? shows the spatial distribution of local violence in 2008, 2010 and 2012. The
decline in violence in Table ?? appears to be most pronounced in Lofa County, and least so
in Nimba. Because these towns are not a representative sample, however, we cannot be sure
whether violence is spatially concentrated in this way throughout the three counties, rather
than just among the towns in our sample. Areas that appear relatively unpopulated may
include towns that are simply absent from our dataset, and where we therefore do not know
the prevalence of violence.
While we do find evidence of spatial autocorrelation, proximity to towns that report
violence in one period seems not to be correlated with the onset of violence in the next.
Table ?? investigates this relationship through descriptive statistics and OLS regression.
Compared to towns that reported violence in 2010, those that did not seem to be further
away on average from towns that reported violence in 2008. This difference is not statistically
significant, however, and may be explained by the fact that towns that reported violence in
2010 tend to be further away from all other towns. Controlling for this distance, there is no
correlation between nearby violence in the past and violence in the present.
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Figure A.1: Communities experiencing violence
(a) 2008
ÎÌÌĮĚŒÙŬŨŤŪȘŤ
(b) 2010
ÎÌÍÌĚŒÙŬŨŤŪȘŤ
(c) 2012
ÎÌÍÎĚŒÙŬŨŤŪȘŤ
Distribution of violent events over time.
Study towns experiencing violence are red.
Study towns that do not experience vio-
lence are black.
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Qualitative follow-up on survey-based reports of local violence
Quantitative data
We collected three types of qualitative data:
1. Between the first and second phases of data collection (2008–10), we and three Liberian
research assistants conducted 104 formal interviews with respondents in 20 purposefully
selected towns. We selected towns with high and low levels of conflict, as well as
those showing variation along potentially important correlates of conflict (exposure to
wartime violence, remoteness and size).
2. Following the second wave of data collection (2010–11), we sent our Liberian research
assistants to investigate and verify all incidents of collective violence reported in the
survey through interviews and written notes. While we did not have the resources to
back-check other types of violence, these interviews helped us validate the survey data
and explore the interconnections between apparently disparate violent events.
3. Finally, during the third wave of data collection, enumerators sought to record a short
qualitative interview with any leader who reported an incident of violence (with the
exception of serious fights, which we excluded).15 Excluding serious fights, we have
qualitative information on 125 (74%) of all leader reports of violence.16 This exercise
served two main purposes. First, it helped us to further validate the survey data, build-
ing our confidence that the dependent variable was measured with as little reporting
bias as possible. Second, along with the earlier interviews, it informed our decision to
aggregate different categories of violence into a single indicator.
This latter validation data provides two main insights: into survey categorization and po-
tential for non-violent events to be captured in the survey.
Exploring variation in survey-based categorization
In general, respondents who reported incidents in the survey continued to do so during
qualitative follow-up. However, the interviews also suggested that grouping incidents into
non-overlapping categories would be challenging. Respondents described the same incidents
in strikingly different ways. Much of this ambiguity resulted from the dynamics of conflict
escalation. The police and courts in Liberia are notoriously inept, inaccessible and corrupt.
15Unfortunately, these were accidentally excluded by the field data collection team without the authors’
awareness.
16There are several explanations for missingness. In some cases enumerators failed to record leaders’
accounts altogether. In others, enumerators recorded leaders’ accounts, but the recordings were lost over the
course of data collection. In still others, enumerators recorded leaders’ accounts but the recordings could
not be transcribed because the audio was too poor. 12 leader accounts fall into this third category, and 32
fall into the first two.
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Because victims cannot rely on these institutions to resolve disputes, violence easily mutates
from one form to another (e.g., a murder turns into a riot or mob justice). Riots, lynchings
and trials by ordeal often serve as extrajudicial mechanisms for adjudicating other types of
crime (e.g., rape, murder, or suspected witchcraft). The distinction between violent ethnic
clashes and violent strikes was also quite murky.
There are numerous specific examples from our fieldwork, and we outline a handful here for
illustration.
• In our largest study town—Voinjama, Lofa County—the mysterious disappearance and
killing of a girl provoked a peaceful protest which quickly turned violent. The (Lorma
and Christian) mother of the missing girl accused the town’s Mandingo (Muslim) pop-
ulation of abducting and murdering the girl in a ritual killing. Traditional healers
(“Zoes”) were called to attempt to divine the identity of the perpetrator, fomenting al-
legations of witchcraft. Riots ensued, killing four. In our interviews, respondents varied
dramatically in how they categorized the sequence of events—as a riot, a murder, a
violent confrontation between tribes, a fight between men, a lynching of suspected
witches, or several or all of the above.
• In one of the larger towns, a hit-and-run accident provoked a violent protest by the
motorbike union. In their descriptions of the incident, some respondents focused on
the hit-and-run, others on the violent protest.
• In several towns, respondents described how trials by ordeal had been used to identify
suspected murderers, typically in cases involving an unusual or mysterious death. As
one local leader explained: “A little girlâĂępassed away within this town and everybody
was surprised of that particular death, so the parents of that little girl decided to go for
sassy wood [trial by ordeal]âĂę The sassy wood man came and he...used hot cutlass—
they put the cutlass on the fire and...if you ainâĂŹt part of it will just be like water on
your skinâĂę They started to do it going around all the people in the neighborhood....
They started touching them with the hot cutlass...and the cutlass was able to grab one
personâĂębecause that particular person was the doer of the act.”
• In a small town, we directly observed a seemingly intoxicated woman attack a man.
Shortly thereafter another woman—a female relative or friend of the man—attacked the
first woman. As the two women grappled, male family members and friends gathered
and began to exchange insults. A physical fight between two of the men ensued.
The crowd continued to grow, and several bystanders began agitating to join the fray.
While the incident was eventually diffused, its interpersonal and collective dimensions
remained difficult to disentangle.
Identifying potentially non-violent incidents
The 2012 qualitative accounts are not exhaustive, but a review suggests some potential for
misreporting of “nonviolent” events as violent ones, though this depends on what types of
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coercive acts one considers “violent.”
1. In three of the 16 cases of extrajudicial violence, individuals may have elected to take
sassywood oaths. The qualitative follow-up suggests that these individuals were not
forced to consume a potion or burn themselves with a hot cutlass, but instead willingly
participated in a milder procedure. In one community, both accounts of extrajudicial
violence suggest that the sassywood process involved the accused voluntarily swearing
an oath in a non-violent manner. In another town, the two accounts of the case suggest
that the accused woman volunteered to participate in the sassywood (although whether
she took an oath or engaged in riskier procedure such as poison drinking is less clear).
She survived. Finally, in another community, there are two reports of extrajudicial
violence. One of the recordings is too poor to understand, while the other account
suggests that the oath was voluntary and no one was hurt.
2. Three of our 7 cases of collective violence may have actually been relatively peaceful
protests. In one community, we have two reports, one of a protest against an interna-
tional mining company, and one of a protest of the town commissioner’s leadership. It
is unclear if these accounts are describing the same incident or related incidents, but
both interviews say explicitly that the protests were not violent. In another community,
we collected two reports of a protest related to a land dispute, and both mentioned
that the dispute was not violent. In still another community, there are two reports
of a violent strike. For one of these reports, the recording quality is too poor for us
to extract any qualitative data. Qualitative data from the other report describes a
dispute over land brushing, but the respondent repeats “they did not spoil nothing”,
which we interpret to mean there was no violence. 17
3. In one of our five communities coded as experiencing a murder, the case might be
better described as either an accidental or negligent killing, from a hunting accident.
All three leaders who confirmed the event in the qualitative data suggest that the
victim could have died by accident. Nevertheless, the case did involve a violent death
and was of interest to the community authorities, and there was uncertainty regarding
what exactly transpired.18
Overall, five of the 40 incidents (13%) of violence in 2012 could be coded as zeroes if we
adopted a more conservative coding rule based on the qualitative data. All are of significant
police interest, so it’s not clear we would ant to ignore them in an early warning system.
Nonetheless, we consider this scenario below.
17In addition to these two communities, there are 2 communities for which we collected 1 report of a
non-violent protest that we coded as violent, but, because there was only one report in each community, the
towns were never coded as having strikes.
18There are two other reports that we coded as murders, while the qualitative data reported accidental
deaths while hunting. These reports occur in separate communities and are the sole reports of murder for
those communities, so our dependent variable is unaffected by these according to our original coding. Finally,
there is one town where there are 3 reports of the same murder happening in the bush. One of the three
reports suggests the death could have been an accident, but the other two call it a murder, and one mentions
an arrest of the shooter.
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Table A.3: % of towns with any major incident of crime or violence, 2008–12 (n=242)
Coding rule 2008 2010 2012
By event type (as in Table 1 of main paper) 37% 17% 17%
By event category (modal leader reports event in same category) 39% 20% 18%
By any event (modal leader reports any kind of seven events) 40% 27% 20%
There is also one case where we coded an account as extrajudicial violence, but the qualitative
data makes it clear that a murder occurred. However, this is the only account of extrajudicial
violence in this community, so this miscoding does not affect our final dependent variable.
In principle this could be an undercounted incident.
All other qualitative accounts were consistent with our survey data and increase out confi-
dence in our quantitative measures of violence and our conservative coding of the dependent
variable. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the data are sometimes challenging to inter-
pret, especially for cases of extrajudicial punishment. By definition these cases are always
associated with other events, which range from stealing to suspected witchcraft to murder.
There is variation in whether individuals report that the accused participated willingly in
extrajudicial procedures, or whether they were forced to do so. In addition, the procedures
themselves vary, from being forced to drink poison to being burned with a hot knife to
swearing an oath in front of the community. Nevertheless, all extrajudicial punishments are
illegal in Liberia and are of interest to local authorities responsible for maintaining order
and security.
Alternative coding rules
Difficulty of categorization raises the possibility that our coding rule (modal leader reports of
each of the seven event types) could underreport the least well-known and most ambiguous
incidents of violence. For instance, if two leaders were unaware of an event, and the other
two differed in their description of the event—one calling it a trial by ordeal and the other
referencing the rape that preceded the trial by ordeal, for instance—then we would code
no event. In principle this biases our coding towards better-known events with established
narratives.
Table ?? reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variable under alternative coding
rules. The first row corresponds to the coding rule reported in the paper. For the second
row, rather than take the modal leader report for each of seven types of violence, we instead
take the modal leader report for each of three categories of violence. For the third row, we
take the modal leader report of any violence. The prevalence of violence increases with each
of these changes to the coding rule. However, the increase is generally modest, and no more
than a few percentage points. (The exception is the increase in 2010 violence between the
second and third rows). We report predictive performance for these alternatives in Appendix
??.
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Relative reliability of survey- vs. news-based data
We validate our events qualitatively, as described above. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
further validate our data against third party sources, such as the Armed Conflict Location
and Event Data Project, or ACLED (?). First, the events we measure are inherently smaller-
scale than those reported in ACLED and other news-based datasets. Second, the majority
of the events in the ACLED dataset occurred during, not after, the Liberian civil war, so
the datasets do not overlap much in time. Third, as we discuss below, news-based databases
are incomplete and biased, especially in fragile states such as Liberia.
While we cannot validate our data against other sources, we can make more general compar-
isons between them. We can compare our interview-based (and qualitatively validated) data
to at least three alternatives: the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System or ICEWS (?);
ACLED (?); and (in Liberia) the Liberian Armed Violence Observatory or LAVO (?). These
three datasets represent prominent approaches to sub-national data collection on violence.
ICEWS is a machine-coded events database constructed exclusively from web-based news
reports (via Factiva). ACLED is human-coded, and draws on a combination of web-based
news, NGO and research reports. LAVO is human-coded and draws on a similar combination
of sources, but focuses exclusively on Liberia, and includes both web- and print-based news,
as well as police and hospital records. Each of these datasets illustrates the challenges of
capturing local violence in a setting like Liberia.
• Many news-based events do not have specific location information. ? notes that news-
based datasets like ICEWS “will often fail to identify the specific location (i.e. city)
of reported events up to 80% of the time.” For instance, 68% of all ICEWS events in
Liberia do not specify a county (akin to a state or province), and 81% do not specify a
town or city. Of events with a location, more than half are in the capital. ICEWS has
the advantage that non-geolocated events are included, so the extent of incompleteness
is clearer than for sources such as ACLED.19
• News-based datasets likely underreport conflicts. ? note, for example, that news re-
ports constitute only a “tiny, tiny fraction” of the events that occur in a given location
over a given period of time, and are “non-randomly selected by reporters and editors.”
They also note that the dictionaries used to populate news-based datasets are “very
generic” and tend to “bin together events that may not always belong together.” In
this sense, questions of aggregation that we view as a choice in our models are an-
swered by default in many news-based datasets. We see two notable examples of this
underreporting in Liberia and the DRC.
– ? collected detailed village histories of rebel attacks and occupation in 380 com-
19Our understanding is that ACLED does not include events with incomplete information such as location,
and so the extent of selection bias is unclear.
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munities in Eastern DRC. He finds that only about 5 to 10% of attacks are
recorded by ACLED. The difference is greatest in the most intense periods of war
(when there may be too many incidents to report) and also varies systematically
with rebel occupation (as these groups likely limit the flow of information).
– In Liberia, a major limitation is the capacity and reach of the written press.
Liberian reporters have limited to no funds to travel outside the capital and a
few major towns except in response to the most serious crises. Rural reporting is
mainly limited to community and national radio, which do not enter news-based
datasets. Thus reporting is heavily biased to the most populous areas. Indeed,
in 2012 just 0.1% of LAVO violent events were taken from media sources. The
rest were gleaned from police and hospital records (which, of course, have biases
of their own). Similarly, 63% of the 92 ACLED incidents reported between 2008
and 2012 in Liberia are identified as occurring in the capital. Finally, news-based
datasets tend to focus on higher profile events. Thus, even if they were complete,
our data and coding of events would be different and complementary.
Measurement of risk factors
Descriptive statistics for risk factors
Table ?? reports sample means for all 56 risk factors in 2008 and 2010, with individual survey
responses aggregated to the town level. In some cases we have data from both residents and
leaders and so have two measures of the same predictor. Table ?? reports full summary
statistics. Figure ?? displays density plots for all non-binary variables. In the density plots
for continuous variables, the outliers (towns above the 95 percentile) are excluded from the
graphs.
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Table A.5: Detailed summary statistics for predictors
Year 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
Town
population
# of
households # of tribes
Mosque in
town (leaders)
% Muslims
(leaders)
Mean 2032 3117 238 337 2.63 2.66 0.45 0.21 0.09 0.05
Median 1811 2920 150 272 2 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Minimum 20 30 4 7 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 439 894 36 42 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
90th %ile 4045 5400 568 740 5 4 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.19
Maximum 5000 7250 950 1063 7 8 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67
Standard deviation 1332 1692 225 265 1.58 1.49 0.50 0.41 0.24 0.11
Skewness 0.55 0.27 1.45 0.72 0.88 1.30 0.18 1.39 2.68 2.98
% Muslims
(residents)
% non-native
(residents)
% non-native
(leaders)
% in dominant
group
%
ex-combatants
(residents)
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.82 0.87 0.09 0.08
Median 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.90 0.90 0.05 0.05
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.35 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00
90th %ile 0.60 0.50 0.26 0.50 0.04 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.18
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.39 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.35
Standard deviation 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.07
Skewness 2.43 2.47 2.29 1.70 13.31 4.21 -0.93 -1.55 1.45 0.80
%
ex-combatants
(leaders)
% returned
from internal
displacement % under 30 % male
Mean
educational
attainment
Mean 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.36 0.20 0.27 0.56 0.48 5.17 5.54
Median 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.31 0.20 0.25 0.55 0.48 5.05 5.63
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.90
10th %ile 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.35 0.32 1.74 2.58
90th %ile 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.83 0.40 0.45 0.79 0.65 8.55 8.20
Maximum 1.00 0.15 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.65 1.00 0.80 11.25 11.60
Standard deviation 0.07 0.02 0.37 0.31 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.13 2.57 2.06
Skewness 14.06 3.28 -0.47 0.53 0.72 0.31 -0.19 -0.29 0.13 -0.08
% with no
education
% receiving
any peace
education
Group
participation
% who
contribute to
public facilities
% saying town
is safe at night
Mean 0.45 0.42 0.28 0.34 3.74 3.69 0.86 0.89 0.52 0.43
Median 0.45 0.40 0.25 0.30 3.69 3.70 0.90 0.90 0.53 0.45
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.91 0.13 0.56 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.15 2.15 2.70 0.65 0.76 0.17 0.15
90th %ile 0.80 0.70 0.55 0.60 5.20 4.70 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.68
Maximum 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.80 7.25 5.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95
Standard deviation 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.18 1.22 0.78 0.16 0.09 0.24 0.20
Skewness 0.21 0.40 0.70 0.51 0.06 0.14 -1.71 -0.90 -0.28 0.08
% saying
neighbors are
helpful
Capacity for
collective
action
% who rely on
NGOs
% who rely on
government
Perceived
equity in
institutions
Mean 0.70 0.50 1.79 1.61 0.53 0.53 0.14 0.17 2.60 2.37
Median 0.72 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.52 0.10 0.15 2.65 2.40
Minimum 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.61 1.06
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Table A.5: Detailed summary statistics for predictors
Year 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
10th %ile 0.50 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.30 0.00 0.05 2.20 1.95
90th %ile 0.90 0.70 4.00 3.00 0.80 0.76 0.35 0.33 2.95 2.71
Maximum 1.00 0.90 7.00 6.00 1.00 0.95 0.50 0.47 3.00 2.95
Standard deviation 0.17 0.16 1.60 1.28 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.32
Skewness -0.70 0.02 0.80 0.76 -0.07 0.08 0.84 0.67 -0.80 -0.82
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Table A.5: Detailed summary statistics for predictors
Year 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
% describing
police as
corrupt
% accepting
inter-racial
marriage
% who say
Muslims
shouldn’t be
leaders
% believing
other tribes
are violent
% believing
other tribes
are dirty
Mean 0.33 0.44 0.66 0.73 0.27 0.55 0.30 0.65 0.15 0.56
Median 0.30 0.45 0.67 0.75 0.25 0.60 0.30 0.70 0.10 0.60
Minimum 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.05
10th %ile 0.07 0.20 0.39 0.55 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.38 0.00 0.25
90th %ile 0.63 0.63 0.90 0.89 0.56 0.84 0.60 0.85 0.40 0.81
Maximum 0.94 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00
Standard deviation 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.22
Skewness 0.57 0.05 -0.34 -0.27 0.48 -0.72 0.51 -0.62 1.26 -0.33
1 if a (any)
minority tribe
has
representation
in leadership
% reporting
burglary
% reporting
assault
% reporting
any land
conflict
Any violent
event (lagged
DV)
Mean 0.59 0.84 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.21 0.37 0.17
Median 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
90th %ile 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.55 0.40 1.00 1.00
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.55 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 0.49 0.36 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.22 0.14 0.48 0.38
Skewness -0.35 -1.89 1.35 0.68 1.26 1.12 0.78 0.53 0.53 1.72
% landless
(leaders)
% landless
(residents) % farmers
Unemployment
rate Wealth index
Mean 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.55 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Median 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.55 0.00 0.05 -0.18 -0.02
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.91 -1.75
10th %ile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 -0.68 -0.54
90th %ile 0.02 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.45 0.80 0.15 0.16 0.93 0.57
Maximum 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.35 1.55 0.99
Standard deviation 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.60 0.42
Skewness 12.96 13.28 1.11 2.16 0.93 -0.28 2.11 1.01 0.76 -0.11
S.D. of wealth
index
Exposure to
war violence
Participation
in war violence
% reporting
loss of land
during war
% displaced
during war
Mean 0.69 0.76 4.28 5.19 0.31 0.45 0.10 0.09 0.80 0.84
Median 0.64 0.74 4.30 5.05 0.25 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.89 0.90
Minimum 0.21 0.16 0.90 2.55 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.33
10th %ile 0.32 0.42 2.20 3.85 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.55
90th %ile 1.11 1.11 6.50 6.95 0.63 0.70 0.25 0.21 1.00 1.00
Maximum 1.51 2.97 9.89 9.10 1.67 1.20 1.00 0.35 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 0.31 0.30 1.64 1.25 0.27 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.23 0.17
Skewness 0.58 1.60 0.18 0.53 1.31 0.28 2.50 0.79 -1.17 -1.21
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Table A.5: Detailed summary statistics for predictors
Year 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
Social services
Magistrate or
police station
in town
Frequency of
police visits
Over 1 hr.
from nearest
road (leaders)
Cell coverage
in town
Mean 5.61 6.81 0.19 0.18 1.26 1.23 0.14 0.03 0.58 0.74
Median 5.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
90th %ile 9.00 10.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 14.00 14.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 2.64 2.77 0.39 0.38 0.81 0.75 0.35 0.18 0.49 0.44
Skewness 0.53 0.43 1.61 1.69 -0.51 -0.41 2.02 5.22 -0.32 -1.07
1 or fewer
radio stations
in town
Natural
resources
within 2 hours
Commodity
price index
% affected by
human disease
% affected by
livestock
disease
0.87 0.04 1.44 1.77 0.60 0.69 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.30
Median 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.75 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.31
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
90th %ile 1.00 0.00 2.50 2.75 2.00 2.00 0.13 0.38 0.50 0.50
Maximum 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.50 4.00 3.00 0.50 0.56 0.75 0.67
Standard deviation 0.34 0.20 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.81 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.15
Skewness -2.17 4.61 0.92 0.17 1.52 0.89 2.81 0.36 1.29 0.09
% affected by
crop failure
0.26 0.29
Median 0.25 0.28
Minimum 0.00 0.00
10th %ile 0.00 0.06
90th %ile 0.56 0.50
Maximum 0.75 0.75
Standard deviation 0.20 0.17
Skewness 0.56 0.28
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Figure A.2: Predictor density plots
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Sampling error in risk factors
In the paper we report a ranking of predictors in our models. A majority of these predictors
come from a survey of 20 residents per town, and variables with especially high sampling error
might be disproportionately penalized, especially in the lasso model. We examine relative
sampling error by variable in Table ??. We bootstrapped standard errors for each variable
for each town, repeatedly resampling the 20 observations, with replacement. We then report
the average rescaled bootstrapped standard error. We repeat this process for standardized
versions of the predictors (which we use in the forecasting models) and non-standardized
versions as well. In Table ?? the three resident survey variables selected by the main lasso
model are in bold.
We see that the lasso does tend to favor variables with lower sampling variability. The
lasso does not, however, select any of the low-variability economic variables (such as wealth
and landlessness), which is consistent with our interpretation in the paper and suggests
that economic risk factors are relatively less important in these towns. Moreover, some of
the variables with the lowest sampling variability are not highly ranked in any model (e.g.
percent Muslim), which suggests that sampling error alone is not driving our results.
Models
This section describes in more detail the estimation methods for each prediction model,
summarizing the generic method and highlighting the specific modeling choices we made in
each case.20
Lasso
Given some dataset (xi, yi) where xi denotes a set of j standardized predictor variables and
yi a vector of responses, the lasso coefficients β are given by:
l (β) = -
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + exp
(
−βTxiyi
))
+λ
k∑
j=1
|βj|
where the first expression on the right hand side is a standard maximum likelihood estimator,
and the second is the penalty function specific to lasso. λ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter that
controls the degree of coefficient shrinkage; the coefficients on poor performers are forced
to 0 and thus dropped from the model. A ridge regression looks similar, except that the
penalty is λ
∑k
j=1 βj
2. The key difference between lasso and ridge regression is that the latter
assigns non-zero coefficients to all predictors, though the coefficients on poorly performing
indicators can be very small. Ridge regression thus performs coefficient shrinkage only, while
lasso performs both coefficient shrinkage and variable selection, and so generally produces
more parsimonious models. We opt for an elastic net, which uses a penalty that is a weighted
sum of the lasso and ridge penalty:
20There are several online resources that provide introductions to machine learning for newcomers,
including the Hopkins Practical Machine Learning online course, https://www.coursera.org/course/
predmachlearn, and the StackExchange question and answer site, http://stats.stackexchange.com/.
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Table A.6: Relative sampling variability of predictors (resident survey variables only)
Standardized Not Standardized
Covariate Rank Mean Std. Err. Rank Mean Std. Err.
% male 1 0.63 9 0.11
Participation in war violence 2 0.58 5 0.15
% saying neighbors are helpful 3 0.55 15 0.09
% ex-combatants (residents) 4 0.54 32 0.05
% under 30 5 0.53 19 0.08
% who rely on NGOs 6 0.51 10 0.10
% who rely on government 7 0.49 21 0.06
% accepting inter-racial marriage 8 0.48 14 0.10
% describing police as corrupt 9 0.47 11 0.10
% non-native (residents) 10 0.46 26 0.06
% receiving any peace education 11 0.46 16 0.09
% with no education 12 0.43 12 0.10
Perceived equity in institutions 13 0.42 8 0.12
Unemployment rate 14 0.42 33 0.03
% saying town is safe at night 15 0.42 13 0.10
% reporting loss of land during war 16 0.41 31 0.05
% reporting burglary 17 0.40 28 0.06
S.D. of wealth index 18 0.40 7 0.12
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 19 0.39 18 0.08
Exposure to war violence 20 0.39 2 0.63
% believing other tribes are violent 21 0.38 17 0.09
Mean educational attainment 22 0.38 1 0.98
% believing other tribes are dirty 23 0.37 25 0.06
% landless (residents) 24 0.36 24 0.06
% who contribute to public facilities 25 0.36 29 0.06
% farmers 26 0.34 23 0.06
% reporting any land conflict 27 0.33 20 0.07
Group participation 28 0.30 4 0.37
% reporting assault 29 0.28 27 0.06
% displaced during war 30 0.28 22 0.06
% in dominant group 31 0.27 30 0.06
Wealth index 32 0.25 6 0.15
# of tribes 33 0.24 3 0.38
% Muslims (residents) 34 0.08 34 0.02
Bolded rows represent individual-level variables selected by the lasso model in the paper.
xxi
l (β) = -
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + exp
(
−βTxiyi
))
+λ
α k∑
j=1
|βj|+ (1− α)
k∑
j=1
β2j

We use a variation known as “elastic net optimization.” that involves a scalar α, which
regulates the weight given to lasso (α = 1) versus ridge (α = 0) optimization. In our
preferred model we set α = .95, thus weighting the lasso penalty much more strongly than
the ridge. We use a modification of lasso analogous to logit in order to accommodate our
binary dependent variable. Thus, for a given observation, our model generates a predicted
probability of violence between 0 and 1. We then classify each observation as 0 or 1 (violence
or no violence) according to a discrimination threshold that is chosen by cross-validation to
maximize sensitivity, keeping accuracy above 50%.
Our training procedure is as follows. First, we split the sample into five subsets, or folds.
We then train a lasso model on four of the five folds. This is the initial training set. The
lasso is fit over a sequence of 80 lambdas in the training data, in effect producing 80 lasso
models, each with a different lambda (and thus a different vector of coefficients). The lambda
that maximizes sensitivity while maintaining accuracy above 50% in the training set is then
applied to the test set. We iterate this process over the five possible combinations of folds
into training and test sets. This is one cross-validation. We then repeat this process 200
times and calculate the average optimal lambda across these 200 cross-validationsâĂŤ80,000
regressions in total. Finally, we repeat the cross-validation procedure 200 additional times,
this time applying the average optimal lambda to every model. We calculate performance
metrics within each of these 200 trials, then report the average of each metric.
Random forests
Given some dataset (xi, yi), a regression tree sorts observations into leaves and makes a
prediction, yˆ, for each leaf. Trees are constructed stepwise. Initially, all observations are on
the same leaf. The observations are then divided into two leaves based on values of one of the
k predictors, so that the sum of squared deviations from the mean in each leaf is minimized.
More formally, we minimize:
MSE =
2∑
l=1
 Nl∑
i=1
(yi − y¯j)2

where y¯j is the average outcome in leaf j and Nj is the number of observations in leaf j. In
the next step, each of the these leaves is split again based on the predictor that most reduces
the sum of squared deviations from the mean in the leaf (this could be the same predictor
that was chosen in the first step). In principle, this process could continue until all leaves
contain only observations of the same value (and MSE = 0). However, researchers typically
employ some sort of stopping criteria before that happens. In our case, we set the maximum
number of nodes to be 5. Because we use regression trees rather than classification trees,
each observation is assigned a predicted probability rather than a binary (0/1) prediction.
Random forests are comprised of many trees fit to random subsets of the data with random
subsets of predictors available for splitting. Each tree generates a distinct predicted proba-
bility for each observation, and the prediction for the entire random forest model is just the
average of the predictions of each tree in the forest.
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For our random forests model, we grow 1,000 trees with a maximum of 5 terminal nodes
each and
√
56 variables sampled (without replacement) at each node.
Neural networks
Neural networks are layered systems of weighted sums of predictor variables with a final
weighted sum mapped into the prediction space. In order to control model complexity,
practitioners specify the number of layers and the number of weighted sums (called nodes)
that comprise each layer. Our model has one layer and 5 nodes, and a weight decay of 0.1
with randomly selected near-zero starting values. Using five different sets of weights, the 56
predictors plus a constant are mapped onto each of the 5 nodes. Then, these five nodes plus
another constant are mapped, by some linear combination of weights, to a scalar. Finally,
this scalar is mapped by a logistic function to the interval [0, 1], our prediction space. Hence,
our network is defined by 287 weights (56× 5 + 5 + 2). they are initially chosen at random,
and then tuned iteratively to minimize the mean-squared error in the prediction space. The
net is trained via back-propagation.
More specifically, a neural network is a two-stage regression or classification model, typically
represented as a âĂĲnetwork diagramâĂİ with K units at the top; the kth unit models the
probability of class k. In our classification model k = 1 and the response Yk=1 is simply a
binary variable.
Neural networks capture interactivity by generating âĂĲderived features,âĂİ denoted Zm,
from linear combinations of the predictors, then modeling the response as a function of linear
combinations of the derived features:
Zm = σ(α0m + α
T
mX),m = 1, ...,M
Tk = β0k + β
T
k Z, k = 1, ..., K
fk(X) = gk(T ), k = 1, ..., K
where Z = {Z1, ..., Zm}, T = {T1, ..., Tk}, σ(ν) is an initial non-linear transformation of the
predictors, and gk(T ) is a final transformation of the output vector T . For the special case
where σ = 1, the network collapses to a linear model. For a more thorough explanation of
neural networks and their analogies to maximum likelihood, see ?.
Supplemental tables
Reconciliation of original to current models
The original lasso model results, calculated before the 2012 data collection, are presented
in Column 1 of Table ??. A small number of relatively minor technical changes were made
after the 2012 data were collected, not with an eye to improving model performance but to
correct small errors or adhere to expert recommendations. Table ?? details each change in
turn, including the cumulative effect on predictions and risk factors.
First, we switched from the lars package to the glmnet package in R (Column 2). Second,
we estimated cross-validated forecast errors by applying a single set of optimal parameters
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across 200 cross-validated trials, rather than estimating the error using a varied set of op-
timal parameters identified within each trial (Column 2). Finally, we standardized dummy
variables, which we had not been doing in previous models. These changes had little material
effect on model performance or risk factor rankings in the cross-validated forecasts.
Robustness to alternate model parameters
Lasso
Table ?? reports various robustness checks for the cross-validated forecasts (Panel A), true
forecasts (Panel B), and corresponding risk factors and rankings (Panel C), limiting to the
latter to the top five factors only. The columns are as follows:
1. Main specification: From Tables 3 and 4 in main paper.
2. New seed: We specify an alternate randomization seed for the selection of folds which
are used to estimate model parameters and error rates using 2010 outcomes.
3. Dummies not standardized: We keep binary predictors on a (0,1) scale rather than
standardizing them to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
4. 10-fold cross validation: We identify optimal parameters and estimate forecast error
rates using 10-fold cross validation rather than 5-fold cross validation.
5. α = 1 : α is the weight placed on the lasso penalty (sum of coefficient magnitudes)
relative to the ridge penalty (sum of squared coefficients). In the paper we use α = .95.
When α = 1, we have a pure lasso penalty.
6. α = .5 : sets the penalty to be half-way between a lasso and ridge penalty.
7. Subset (30) from OLS: We first fit an OLS model to the 2008/2010 data to determine
the 30 coefficients of greatest magnitude. We then use only those 30 predictors for the
model.
8. Nonlinear transformations of skewed variables: Several covariates have a high skew,
and it is possible that nonlinear transformations could improve performance or change
the relevant risk factors. We take all variables with a skew greater than 1 and use their
natural logarithm (or the logarithm of one plus the variable if the range includes zero).
Random forests
Table ?? reports various robustness checks for the cross-validated forecasts (Panel A), true
forecasts (Panel B), and corresponding risk factors and rankings (Panel C), limiting the
latter to the top five factors only. The columns are as follows:
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Table A.7: Reconciliation of original to current lasso predictions
Original
Model
Change in
cross
validation
Standardized
indicators
Performance metric (1) (2) (3)
AUC 0.56 0.58
True positives (sensitivity) 69% 67% 77%
True negatives (specificity) 49% 44% 41%
Overall accuracy 52% 48% 47%
Ratio of false + to true + 3.98 4.00 3.68
Ratio of false - to true + 0.52 0.50 0.31
(a) Cross-validated forecast (2010)
Original
Model
Change in
cross
validation
Standardized
indicators
Performance metric (1) (2) (3)
AUC 0.66 0.65
True positives (sensitivity) 85% 88%
True negatives (specificity) 35% 23%
Overall accuracy 43% 33%
Ratio of false + to true + 3.88 4.46
Ratio of false - to true + 0.18 0.14
(b) 2012 Forecasts
Original
Model
Change in
cross
validation
Standardized
indicators
Performance metric (1) (2) (3)
Minority tribe in leadership 1 1 1
Town population 2 9 2
% in largest tribe 3 6 4
% Muslim 4 10
% reporting armed robbery or burglary 5
% contributing to public facilities 6 4 5
# of tribes 7
% reporting loss of land during war 8
Number of resources available 9 8
Wealth index 10 14
% farmers 2
% believing other tribes are violent 3 3
Participation in war violence 5
Frequency of police visits 7
(c) Risk Factor Rankings
xxv
Ta
bl
e
A
.8
:
La
ss
o
m
od
el
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
ch
ec
ks
(a
)
C
ro
ss
-v
al
id
at
ed
fo
re
ca
st
(2
01
0)
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
m
et
ri
c
M
ai
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
N
ew
se
ed
D
um
m
ie
s
no
t
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
10
-F
ol
d
C
ro
ss
-
V
al
id
at
io
n
α
=
1
α
=
.5
Su
bs
et
(3
0)
fr
om
O
L
S
N
on
lin
ea
r
tr
an
s.
A
U
C
0.
58
0.
58
0.
56
0.
58
0.
58
0.
57
0.
61
.5
7
B
ri
er
sc
or
e
0.
14
0.
14
0.
16
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
T
ru
e
po
si
ti
ve
s
(s
en
si
ti
vi
ty
)
77
%
75
%
68
%
80
%
76
%
86
%
83
%
78
%
T
ru
e
ne
ga
ti
ve
s
(s
pe
ci
fic
it
y)
40
%
40
%
43
%
42
%
40
%
24
%
30
%
36
%
O
ve
ra
ll
ac
cu
ra
cy
47
%
46
%
47
%
49
%
46
%
35
%
39
%
44
%
R
at
io
of
fa
ls
e
+
to
tr
ue
+
3.
71
3.
84
4.
06
3.
45
3.
82
4.
23
4.
03
3.
89
R
at
io
of
fa
ls
e
-
to
tr
ue
+
0.
30
0.
33
0.
49
0.
25
0.
33
0.
17
0.
20
0.
29
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
m
et
ri
c
M
ai
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
N
ew
se
ed
D
um
m
ie
s
no
t
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
10
-F
ol
d
C
ro
ss
-
V
al
id
at
io
n
α
=
1
α
=
.5
Su
bs
et
(3
0)
fr
om
O
L
S
N
on
lin
ea
r
tr
an
s.
A
U
C
0.
65
0.
66
0.
66
0.
61
0.
65
0.
67
0.
68
0.
66
B
ri
er
sc
or
e
0.
13
0.
13
0.
13
0.
14
0.
13
0.
13
0.
13
0.
13
T
ru
e
po
si
ti
ve
s
(s
en
si
ti
vi
ty
)
88
%
88
%
88
%
88
%
88
%
90
%
88
%
88
%
T
ru
e
ne
ga
ti
ve
s
(s
pe
ci
fic
it
y)
22
%
25
%
34
%
17
%
25
%
27
%
24
%
24
%
O
ve
ra
ll
ac
cu
ra
cy
33
%
36
%
43
%
29
%
35
%
37
%
35
%
34
%
R
at
io
of
fa
ls
e
+
to
tr
ue
+
4.
49
4.
31
3.
83
4.
77
4.
34
4.
11
4.
37
4.
40
R
at
io
of
fa
ls
e
-
to
tr
ue
+
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
0.
14
0.
11
0.
14
0.
14
(b
)
20
12
Fo
re
ca
st
s
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
m
et
ri
c
M
ai
n
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
N
ew
se
ed
D
um
m
ie
s
no
t
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
10
-F
ol
d
C
ro
ss
-
V
al
id
at
io
n
α
=
1
α
=
.5
Su
bs
et
(3
0)
fr
om
O
L
S
N
on
lin
ea
r
tr
an
s.
M
in
or
it
y
tr
ib
e
in
to
w
n
le
ad
er
sh
ip
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
T
ow
n
po
pu
la
ti
on
2
2
9
2
2
2
2
%
be
lie
vi
ng
ot
he
r
tr
ib
es
ar
e
vi
ol
en
t
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
%
in
do
m
in
an
t
gr
ou
p
4
4
6
4
4
5
4
4
%
w
ho
co
nt
ri
bu
te
to
pu
bl
ic
fa
ci
lit
ie
s
5
5
4
5
4
3
6
%
of
to
w
n
fa
rm
er
s
2
7
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
in
w
ar
vi
ol
en
ce
5
11
(c
)
R
is
k
fa
ct
or
ra
nk
in
gs
xxvi
1. Main specification: From Tables 3 and 4 in main paper.
2. New seed: We specify an alternate randomization seed for the selection of folds which
are used to estimate parameters and forecast error rates using 2010 outcomes.
3. Classification: Observations on a given leaf are classified by majority vote (with a
weight given to positive votes that is chosen by cross-validation). For all other speci-
fications, observations on a given leaf are assigned a predicted probability of violence
and are then classified based on a discrimination threshold.
4. 10-fold cross validation: We identify optimal parameters and estimate forecast error
rates using 10-fold cross validation rather than 5-fold cross validation.
5. 10 nodes: We limit each tree in the forest to have no more than 10 nodes. For all other
models, we limit trees to 5 nodes.
6. Trees fit to larger sample: We fit each tree to a random sample of 36 observations
rather than 24, the sample size for all other models.
7. 10,000 tree forests: We compose the random forest from 10,000 trees rather than 1,000
trees as we do for all other models.
8. Subset (30) from OLS: We first fit an OLS model to the 2008/2010 data to determine
the 30 coefficients of greatest magnitude. We then use only those 30 predictors for the
model.
9. Subset of 5 lasso variables: We use only the 5 risk factors selected by the main lasso
model, listed in the main paper.
Neural networks
Table ?? reports various robustness checks for the cross-validated forecasts (Panel A) and
true forecast results (Panel B). The columns are as follows:
1. Main specification: From Tables 3 and 4.
2. New seed: We change the randomization seed to get different cross-validation runs and
fit our models using different (randomly selected) initial weights.
3. 10-Fold Cross-Validation: We choose a threshold and estimate forecast error using
10-fold cross-validation rather than 5-fold, as in our preferred model.
4. Size = 10: We use 10 nodes in our hidden layer rather than 5, as in our preferred
model.
5. Low decay: We force our weights to decay at a rate of 0.01 rather than 0.1 as in our
preferred model.
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6. High decay: We force our weights to decay at a rate of 0.5 rather than 0.1 as in our
preferred model.
7. Subset (30) from OLS: We first fit an OLS model to the 2008/2010 data to determine
the 30 coefficients of greatest magnitude. We then use only those 30 predictors for the
model.
8. Subset of 5 lasso variables: We use only the 5 risk factors selected by the main lasso
model, listed in the main paper.
9. Nonlinear transformations of skewed variables: Several covariates have a high skew,
and it is possible that nonlinear transformations could improve performance or change
the relevant risk factors. We take all variables with a skew greater than 1 and use their
natural logarithm (or the logarithm of one plus the variable if the range includes zero).
Logit
While logit is advantageous in its simplicity and familiarity, it has a number of disadvantages
for our purposes. In particular, while lasso, random forests and neural networks can accom-
modate many highly collinear predictors simultaneously, logit generally cannot. Because
we have a large number of predictors relative to the number of observations, and because
some of those predictors are highly collinear, our logit coefficients are unstable and therefore
unreliable.
By way of illustration, Table ?? reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all logit
coefficients in the cross-validated forecasts. The VIF measures the extent to which mul-
ticollinearity increases the variance of a given coefficient. When a regressor is completely
orthogonal to the other regressors, the VIF is equal to one.
Column (1) shows that multicollinearity is indeed an issue in the logit model. The logit
VIF is larger than five on 14 of our risk factors, larger than 10 on four of our risk factors,
and as large as 39.86 on our measure of participation in wartime violence.
Lasso is designed to address precisely this issue. Column (2) reports the VIF for the
five predictors assigned non-zero coefficients in the cross-validated lasso models. The largest
lasso VIF is 1.13, which is still smaller than the smallest logit VIF (1.73). Indeed, the lasso
VIFs are remarkably close to 1, suggesting that the algorithm successfully chooses predictors
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that are relatively uncorrelated with one another. The result is a parsimonious model in
which each predictor contains as much unique information as possible relative to the others.
Table A.11: Variance inflation factors for logit coefficients
Logit Lasso
(1) (2)
Town population 4.01 1.02
# of households 3.45
# of tribes 5.71
% Muslims (leaders) 9.88
Has mosque 2.06
% Muslims (residents) 9.10
% non-native (residents) 2.65
% non-native (leaders) 7.59
% in dominant group 8.52 1.13
% ex-combatants (residents) 35.10
% ex-combatants (leaders) 9.02
% returned from internal displacement 2.55
% under 30 2.33
% male 2.99
Mean educational attainment 19.76
% with no education 16.53
% receiving any peace education 1.88
Group participation (0-9) 5.09
% who contribute to public facilities 2.76 1.06
% saying town is safe at night 2.69
% saying neighbors are helpful 2.45
Collective public goods 3.55
% who rely on NGOs 2.30
% who rely on government 1.94
Perceived equity in institutions 3.76
% describing police/courts as corrupt 3.64
% accepting inter-racial marriage 2.33
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 2.70
xxxi
% believing other tribes are violent 3.86 1.07
% believing other tribes are dirty 3.34
Minority tribe in town leadership 1.73 1.11
% reporting burglary or robbery 2.96
% reporting assault 4.33
% reporting any land conflict 6.05
Any violent event (lagged DV) 2.08
% of town landless (leaders) 8.05
% of town landless (residents) 2.78
% of town farmers 4.18
Unemployment rate 1.95
Wealth index 7.30
S.D. of wealth index in town 4.14
Exposure to war violence 3.97
Participation in war violence 39.86
% reporting loss of land during war 3.45
% displaced during war 2.45
Social services in town 3.18
Police or magistrate in town 1.91
Frequency of police/NGO visits 2.45
Town >1 hour from road 2.16
Mobile phone coverage 1.75
Less than 2 radio stations 1.74
Natural resources in 2 hours 2.01
Commodity price index 2.65
% affected by human disease 2.00
% affected by livestock disease 2.27
% affected by crop failure 2.35
Robustness to alternate coding rules
Recoding to reduce potential under-reporting
For most of our analysis, we code the dependent variable according to the following proce-
dure:
xxxii
1. Ask each of four local leaders about each of seven types of crime and violence over the
past year.
2. For each type of violence, take the modal response across the four leaders.
3. If at least two leaders report that a given type of violence occurred over the past year,
code the indicator for that type as 1.
4. Aggregate the seven indicators into three categories (capital crimes, collective violence
and extrajudicial punishment).
5. Aggregate the seven indicators into a single indicator for any major destabilizing inci-
dent of crime or violence over the past year.
We tested the robustness of our results to two variations on this procedure. First, we
aggregated the seven indicators into three categories before taking the modal response, then
took the mode and aggregated the resulting three categories into a single indicator. Second,
we aggregated the seven indicators into a single indicator before taking the modal response—
i.e. if at least two leaders reported any kind of violence, then a violent event is coded for
that community. Both of these variations increased the prevalence of violence in the sample.
In 2010, for example, the first and second alternatives increased the prevalence of violence
from 17% to 20% and 27%, respectively.
As we see in Table ?? and Figures ?? and ?? below, all of our models perform better
under these alternative coding rules relative to the original. Our AUCs increase by 5 to 10
percentage points, and our false positive to true positive ratios decrease to below 3:1.
There are at least two possible explanations for this improvement. First, since rare events
are generally more difficult to predict, we may have improved performance by making the
dependent variable less rare. Second, the more restrictive coding rule systematically underes-
timated the prevalence of violence in ambiguous cases. For example, if in a given community
one leader reported that a murder occurred and another reported that a rape occurred, our
original coding rule would have assigned that community a 0 on the aggregate indicator, but
the alternatives would both assign it a 1. If these more ambiguous cases are, for whatever
reason, easier to predict than less ambiguous ones, then we may have improved performance
by including them. The first explanation strikes us as more likely than the second, but
regardless, the results in Table ?? suggest that, if anything, the coding rule we report in the
paper may underestimate the predictive power of our models (at least relative to these two
alternatives).
Recoding to reduce potential over-reporting
Table ?? reproduces Table 4 from the main paper, omitting the 7 ambiguously violent and
malicious events. The AUC declines by a percentage point or two but the results are generally
similar.
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Figure A.3: ROC curves for simulated forecasts of 2010 violence using a less conservative
coding rule
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Figure A.4: ROC curves for true forecasts of 2012 violence using a less conservative coding
rule
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Table A.14: Performance of 2008–10 models in predicting 2012 aggregate violence, omitting
non-violent or ambiguous events
Dependent variable: aggregate violence
Performance metric Logit Lasso Random
forests
Neural
networks
AUC 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.64
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Brier score 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15
True positives (sensitivity) 94% 88% 79% 64%
True negatives (specificity) 34% 22% 30% 52%
Overall accuracy 43% 31% 37% 54%
Ratio of false + to true + 4.42 5.62 5.62 4.76
Ratio of false - to true + 0.06 0.14 0.27 0.57
Disaggregating incidents by category
Table ?? reports the AUC and Brier score for each of our models when separately trained
and tested on each of our three categories of local violence (collective, interpersonal and
extrajudicial). The table also reports five performance metrics at our preferred predicted
probability threshold, selected to maximize sensitivity while maintaining accuracy at or
above 50%. The results are unstable when the dependent variable is disaggregated in this
way, however, and should be interpreted with caution.
Model performance varies across time periods and dependent variables, and no model
unambiguously dominates the others. Moreover, in some cases the model that performs best
in terms of AUC performs worst in terms of Brier score (e.g. the cross-validated neural
networks model for interpersonal violence). Nonetheless, overall the results suggest that we
may be able to forecast even disaggregated violence with accuracy better than chance.
In some cases the performance of these models meets or exceeds that of our models
designed to forecast aggregate violence. For example, while the neural networks model
achieves an AUC of just 0.62 when forecasting aggregate violence in 2012, it achieves an
AUC of 0.71 when forecasting interpersonal violence. Again, however, these disaggregated
results are unstable, and caution is warranted when comparing them to the aggregated ones.
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Table A.16: Cross-validated forecasts of 2010 violence using 2008 risk factors plus distance
to nearest community with violence
Aggregate dependent variable
Performance metric Lasso Random
forests
Neural
networks
AUC 0.59 0.53 0.55
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Brier score 0.15 0.15 0.21
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
True positive rate (sensitivity) 77% 55% 61%
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
True negative rate (specificity) 41% 49% 48%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Accuracy 47% 50% 50%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Ratio of false + to true + 3.52 4.25 3.94
(0.24) (0.44) (0.44)
Ratio of false - to true + 0.31 0.83 0.66
(0.09) (0.16) (0.17)
Robustness to adjustments for spatial autocorrelation
Given the evidence of clustering above, we might expect that including a spatial lag of
violence in nearby towns would improve predictive performance. We explore this possibility
in two ways. First, we add a measure of distance to the nearest town with violence to our set
of risk factors. Table ?? reports performance metrics for cross-validated forecasts including
the spatial lag, and Table ?? reports performance metrics for the true forecasts. Table ??
provides a risk factor ranking. The lasso assigns the spatial lag a coefficient of 0, and the
model’s performance is unchanged. While the spatial lag is ranked 5th most important in the
random forests model, the model’s performance is again unchanged. Including the spatial
lag does improve the true forecast AUC for the neural networks model, but does not change
the Brier score.
As we discuss above, however, distance to the nearest town with violence incorporates
xl
Table A.17: Forecasts of 2012 violence using 2010 risk factors plus distance to nearest com-
munity with violence
Aggregate dependent variable
Performance metric Lasso Random
forests
Neural
networks
AUC 0.64 0.63 0.69
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Brier score 0.13 0.13 0.16
True positive rate (sensitivity) 87% 79% 74%
True negative rate (specificity) 20% 32% 49%
Accuracy 31% 39% 53%
Ratio of false + to true + 4.73 4.47 3.54
Ratio of false - to true + 0.15 0.27 0.36
Table A.18: Rankings of risk factors by model plus distance to nearest community with
violence
Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.298 16 0.00018
Town population 2 0.141 1 0.00285
% believing other tribes are violent 3 0.054 10 0.00033
% in dominant group 4 -0.049 4 0.00070
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.002 48 -0.00013
Mean educational attainment 2 0.00073
% reporting loss of land during war 3 0.00072
Distance to nearest community with violence 5 0.00058
% reporting any land conflict 6 0.00055
# of households 7 0.00050
% with no education 8 0.00048
# of tribes 9 0.00044
xli
information about distance to the nearest town in general, and this latter distance may be
an important correlate of violence in and of itself. To adjust for this possibility, we construct
an alternate measure of nearby violence that does not change with a community’s distance
from other communities in general. For each town i, we construct the measure:
spilloveri =
∑
j∈J I(violencej)/δi,j∑
j∈J 1/δi,j
where J is the set of all towns in the sample excluding i, I(violencej) is an indicator for past
violence in community j, and δi,j is the distance between town i and town j.
Tables ?? and ?? report performance metrics for the cross-validated and true forecasts,
respectively, including this alternate spatial lag. Table ?? provides the risk factor ranking.
While lasso assigns a non-zero (positive) coefficient to this alternate measure, performance
again remains largely unchanged across models. We conclude that incorporating spatial
spillover may improve our models’ performance in some cases, but probably not by much.
Model averaging
Rather than adjudicate between models, here we consider “ensemble” methods instead. One
promising approach is Ensemble Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). This method does not
seem feasible in our case, however, as we do not have enough cross-sections of data to both
train and calibrate our models. Also, it is not clear that BMA is as relevant to our problem,
where we care more about sensitivity than accuracy. BMA weights are functions of log
likelihoods, which are themselves functions of accuracy, not sensitivity.
A simpler “majority vote” method takes the binary predictions from each of the four models
(logit, lasso, random forests, and neural networks) and generates a single prediction according
to what the majority predicts. Since we have an even number of models, we code ties as a
prediction of violence. This is consistent with our overall approach of erring on the side of
sensitivity over specificity. This approach performs similarly to our best models.
An alternative ensemble method is to take predicted probabilities from the four models and
generate a single predicted probability using a logistic regression model. That probability
is then translated into a binary prediction using a discrimination threshold chosen by cross
validation. This approach has the downside, like BMA, of giving equal weight to false
negatives and false positives. This logistic “stack” performs surprisingly poorly.
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Table A.19: Cross-validated forecasts of 2010 violence using 2008 risk factors plus a spatial
lag
Aggregate dependent variable
Performance metric Lasso Random
forests
Neural
networks
AUC 0.59 0.53 0.56
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Brier score 0.15 0.15 0.20
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
True positive rate (sensitivity) 77% 55% 64%
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
True negative rate (specificity) 38% 49% 48%
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Accuracy 45% 50% 50%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Ratio of false + to true + 3.70 4.27 3.81
(0.24) (0.44) (0.41)
Ratio of false - to true + 0.31 0.84 0.59
(0.08) (0.16) (0.16)
Table A.20: Forecasts of 2012 violence using 2010 risk factors plus spatial lag
Aggregate dependent variable
Performance metric Lasso Random
forests
Neural
networks
AUC 0.66 0.66 0.63
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Brier score 0.13 0.13 0.17
True positive rate (sensitivity) 87% 82% 61%
True negative rate (specificity) 20% 36% 56%
Accuracy 31% 43% 56%
Ratio of false + to true + 4.73 4.06 3.78
Ratio of false - to true + 0.15 0.23 0.65
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Table A.21: Rankings of risk factors by model plus spatial lag
Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.321 8 0.00031
Town population 2 0.134 1 0.00244
Nearby violence rate 3 0.080 42 -0.00015
% believing other tribes are violent 4 0.066 9 0.00027
% in dominant group 5 -0.063 4 0.00049
% who contribute to public facilities 6 0.030 48 -0.00019
# of tribes 7 0.000 14 0.00019
# of households 2 0.00096
% believing other tribes are dirty 3 0.00050
Wealth index 5 0.00045
% reporting loss of land during war 6 0.00042
Mean educational attainment 7 0.00032
% reporting neighbors are helpful 10 0.00025
Table A.22: Alternate ensemble methods
(a) Cross-validated forecast (2010)
Logistic
stack
Model
average
Majority
vote
Performance metric (1) (2) (3)
AUC 0.50 0.55
Brier score 0.29 0.16
True positives (sensitivity) 44% 59% 72%
True negatives (specificity) 54% 49% 38%
Overall accuracy 52% 50% 44%
Ratio of false + to true + 5.08 4.16 4.17
Ratio of false - to true + 1.39 0.70 0.40
Logistic
stack
Model
average
Majority
vote
Performance metric (1) (2) (3)
AUC 0.54 0.63
Brier score 0.27 0.14
True positives (sensitivity) 65% 78% 90%
True negatives (specificity) 41% 40% 20%
Overall accuracy 45% 46% 32%
Ratio of false + to true + 4.58 3.90 4.47
Ratio of false - to true + 0.54 0.29 0.11
(b) 2012 Forecasts
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Visualization of trade-off between sensitivity and specificity at our
preferred threshold
We provide another way to visualize the trade-off between true and false positives for the
lasso model in the bar chart in Figure ??. Each bar represents the predicted probability of
violence in one town in 2012. The discrimination threshold is the probability above which
we predict violence will occur—the optimal threshold identified through our cross-validated
forecasts above.
Two features of the bar chart are noteworthy. First, while the number of false positives is
relatively high, the number of false negatives is very low. This is by design: in training
the lasso model to maximize true positives, we also train it to minimize false negatives,
subject only to the constraint that overall accuracy remain at or above 50%. Second, many
of these false positives have relatively high predicted probabilities of violence; indeed, of the
242 towns in our sample, the two with the highest predicted probabilities are in fact false
positives. This pattern does not necessarily imply that the model is inherently flawed, or
that the risk of violence in these towns is in fact lower than it appears. Estimates of risk
are by nature probabilistic: todayâĂŹs false positive may prove to be tomorrowâĂŹs true
positive, though without a longer panel we cannot test this proposition directly.
Visualization of distinction between lasso and logit
Figure ?? offers a visualization of the relationship between lasso and logit. λ is the penalty
placed on the sum of the magnitudes of coefficients for included variables. As we move
along the x-axis and λ decreases, the model becomes more flexible, and the number of
predictors included in the model (fitted with non-zero coefficients) increases. When λ = 0,
our lasso objective function is just the logit objective function. The figure below shows
that our optimally-chosen λ is relatively restrictive. Cross-validation reveals that most of
our available predictors add more noise than signal, and, consequently, we heavily penalize
model complexity.
Risk factor rankings
Table ?? reports full risk factor rankings for the lasso, random forests and logit models
described in the main paper. Tables ??, ?? and ?? report the same rankings sorted by the
magnitude of the lasso coefficients (in absolute value), random forests importance scores and
logit coefficients (in absolute value), respectively.
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Figure A.5: Predicted probabilities of 2012 violence, lasso model, by prediction accuracy
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We apply the parameters from the lasso model estimated in Table 3 to 2010 data calculate the
predicted probabilities of violence in 2012. The dotted line is the optimal threshold above which
we predict violence, estimated in the same exercise (via 200 5-fold cross-validation trials).
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Table A.23: Full risk factor rankings
Lasso Random forests Logit
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance Rank Coeff. s.e.
Town population 2 0.156 1 0.002 47 -0.058 (0.416)
# of households 5 0.001 50 -0.046 (0.352)
# of tribes 4 0.001 52 0.029 (0.461)
% Muslims (leaders) 52 0.000 33 -0.198 (1.034)
Has mosque 30 0.000 23 -0.319 (0.294)
% Muslims (residents) 45 0.000 27 -0.289 (0.983)
% non-native (residents) 10 0.000 45 -0.074 (0.283)
% non-native (leaders) 53 0.000 4 -2.011 (1.209)
% in dominant group 4 -0.048 2 0.001 18 -0.419 (0.555)
% ex-combatants (residents) 39 0.000 3 2.292 (1.253)
% ex-combatants (leaders) 51 0.000 1 3.088 (1.344)
% returned from internal displacement 54 0.000 44 -0.078 (0.319)
% under 30 50 0.000 55 -0.006 (0.312)
% male 48 0.000 49 -0.048 (0.343)
Mean educational attainment 3 0.001 51 0.036 (1.010)
% with no education 14 0.000 15 0.475 (0.950)
% receiving any peace education 55 0.000 46 -0.060 (0.286)
Group participation (0-9) 12 0.000 22 0.329 (0.485)
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.012 47 0.000 8 0.756 (0.455)
% saying town is safe at night 25 0.000 17 -0.459 (0.318)
% saying neighbors are helpful 24 0.000 48 0.057 (0.314)
Collective public goods 27 0.000 25 0.292 (0.353)
% who rely on NGOs 46 0.000 31 -0.230 (0.317)
% who rely on government 33 0.000 24 -0.308 (0.299)
Perceived equity in institutions 49 0.000 14 -0.485 (0.393)
% describing police/courts as corrupt 22 0.000 19 -0.418 (0.395)
% accepting inter-racial marriage 37 0.000 30 0.258 (0.338)
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 42 0.000 41 -0.112 (0.362)
% believing other tribes are violent 3 0.081 23 0.000 10 0.730 (0.395)
% believing other tribes are dirty 28 0.000 40 -0.121 (0.382)
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.306 7 0.000 12 0.691 (0.319)
% reporting burglary or robbery 9 0.000 39 0.129 (0.316)
% reporting assault 16 0.000 16 -0.470 (0.392)
% reporting any land conflict 11 0.000 26 0.291 (0.483)
Any violent conflict 19 0.000 37 0.143 (0.287)
% of town landless (leaders) 35 0.000 5 -1.384 (1.476)
% of town landless (residents) 20 0.000 43 -0.100 (0.330)
% of town farmers 15 0.000 7 -0.979 (0.443)
Unemployment rate 41 0.000 56 0.000 (0.331)
Wealth index 13 0.000 9 0.733 (0.566)
S.D. of wealth index in town 6 0.000 54 0.009 (0.428)
Exposure to war violence 56 -0.001 6 1.162 (0.437)
Participation in war violence 36 0.000 2 -2.802 (1.315)
% reporting loss of land during war 8 0.000 20 -0.380 (0.328)
% displaced during war 26 0.000 38 0.133 (0.310)
Social services in town 31 0.000 35 0.161 (0.366)
Police or magistrate in town 17 0.000 34 -0.167 (0.265)
Frequency of police/NGO visits 29 0.000 11 0.717 (0.345)
Town >1 hour from road 40 0.000 28 0.274 (0.323)
Mobile phone coverage 32 0.000 29 0.265 (0.269)
Less than 2 radio stations 34 0.000 32 0.225 (0.294)
Natural resources in 2 hours 38 0.000 21 -0.373 (0.295)
Commodity price index 21 0.000 13 0.547 (0.298)
% affected by human disease 44 0.000 53 0.022 (0.285)
% affected by livestock disease 18 0.000 36 0.150 (0.311)
% affected by crop failure 43 0.000 42 -0.107 (0.324)
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Table A.24: Full risk factor rankings - sorted on lasso
Lasso Random forests Logit
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance Rank Coeff. s.e.
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.306 7 0.0004 12 0.691 (0.319)
Town population 2 0.156 1 0.0024 47 -0.058 (0.416)
% believing other tribes are violent 3 0.081 23 0.0000 10 0.730 (0.395)
% in dominant group 4 -0.048 2 0.0008 18 -0.419 (0.555)
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.012 47 -0.0001 8 0.756 (0.455)
Mean educational attainment 3 0.0007 51 0.036 (1.010)
# of tribes 4 0.0006 52 0.029 (0.461)
# of households 5 0.0005 50 -0.046 (0.352)
S.D. of wealth index in town 6 0.0004 54 0.009 (0.428)
% reporting loss of land during war 8 0.0004 20 -0.380 (0.328)
% reporting burglary or robbery 9 0.0003 39 0.129 (0.316)
% non-native (residents) 10 0.0003 45 -0.074 (0.283)
% reporting any land conflict 11 0.0002 26 0.291 (0.483)
Group participation (0-9) 12 0.0002 22 0.329 (0.485)
Wealth index 13 0.0002 9 0.733 (0.566)
% with no education 14 0.0002 15 0.475 (0.950)
% of town farmers 15 0.0001 7 -0.979 (0.443)
% reporting assault 16 0.0001 16 -0.470 (0.392)
Police or magistrate in town 17 0.0001 34 -0.167 (0.265)
% affected by livestock disease 18 0.0001 36 0.150 (0.311)
Any violent event (lagged DV) 19 0.0001 37 0.143 (0.287)
% of town landless (residents) 20 0.0001 43 -0.100 (0.330)
Commodity price index 21 0.0001 13 0.547 (0.298)
% describing police/courts as corrupt 22 0.0001 19 -0.418 (0.395)
% saying neighbors are helpful 24 0.0000 48 0.057 (0.314)
% saying town is safe at night 25 0.0000 17 -0.459 (0.318)
% displaced during war 26 0.0000 38 0.133 (0.310)
Collective public goods 27 0.0000 25 0.292 (0.353)
% believing other tribes are dirty 28 0.0000 40 -0.121 (0.382)
Frequency of police/NGO visits 29 0.0000 11 0.717 (0.345)
Has mosque 30 0.0000 23 -0.319 (0.294)
Social services in town 31 0.0000 35 0.161 (0.366)
Mobile phone coverage 32 0.0000 29 0.265 (0.269)
% who rely on government 33 0.0000 24 -0.308 (0.299)
Less than 2 radio stations 34 -0.0001 32 0.225 (0.294)
% of town landless (leaders) 35 -0.0001 5 -1.384 (1.476)
Participation in war violence 36 -0.0001 2 -2.802 (1.315)
% accepting inter-racial marriage 37 -0.0001 30 0.258 (0.338)
Natural resources in 2 hours 38 -0.0001 21 -0.373 (0.295)
% ex-combatants (residents) 39 -0.0001 3 2.292 (1.253)
Town >1 hour from road 40 -0.0001 28 0.274 (0.323)
Unemployment rate 41 -0.0001 56 0.000 (0.331)
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 42 -0.0001 41 -0.112 (0.362)
% affected by crop failure 43 -0.0001 42 -0.107 (0.324)
% affected by human disease 44 -0.0001 53 0.022 (0.285)
% Muslims (residents) 45 -0.0001 27 -0.289 (0.983)
% who rely on NGOs 46 -0.0001 31 -0.230 (0.317)
% male 48 -0.0002 49 -0.048 (0.343)
Perceived equity in institutions 49 -0.0002 14 -0.485 (0.393)
% under 30 50 -0.0002 55 -0.006 (0.312)
% ex-combatants (leaders) 51 -0.0002 1 3.088 (1.344)
% Muslims (leaders) 52 -0.0003 33 -0.198 (1.034)
% non-native (leaders) 53 -0.0003 4 -2.011 (1.209)
% returned from internal displacement 54 -0.0003 44 -0.078 (0.319)
% receiving any peace education 55 -0.0003 46 -0.060 (0.286)
Exposure to war violence 56 -0.0007 6 1.162 (0.437)
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Table A.25: Full risk factor rankings - sorted on random forests
Lasso Random forests Logit
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance Rank Coeff. s.e.
Town population 2 0.156 1 0.0024 47 -0.058 (0.416)
% in dominant group 4 -0.048 2 0.0008 18 -0.419 (0.555)
Mean educational attainment 3 0.0007 51 0.036 (1.010)
# of tribes 4 0.0006 52 0.029 (0.461)
# of households 5 0.0005 50 -0.046 (0.352)
S.D. of wealth index in town 6 0.0004 54 0.009 (0.428)
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.306 7 0.0004 12 0.691 (0.319)
% reporting loss of land during war 8 0.0004 20 -0.380 (0.328)
% reporting burglary or robbery 9 0.0003 39 0.129 (0.316)
% non-native (residents) 10 0.0003 45 -0.074 (0.283)
% reporting any land conflict 11 0.0002 26 0.291 (0.483)
Group participation (0-9) 12 0.0002 22 0.329 (0.485)
Wealth index 13 0.0002 9 0.733 (0.566)
% with no education 14 0.0002 15 0.475 (0.950)
% of town farmers 15 0.0001 7 -0.979 (0.443)
% reporting assault 16 0.0001 16 -0.470 (0.392)
Police or magistrate in town 17 0.0001 34 -0.167 (0.265)
% affected by livestock disease 18 0.0001 36 0.150 (0.311)
Any violent event (lagged DV) 19 0.0001 37 0.143 (0.287)
% of town landless (residents) 20 0.0001 43 -0.100 (0.330)
Commodity price index 21 0.0001 13 0.547 (0.298)
% describing police/courts as corrupt 22 0.0001 19 -0.418 (0.395)
% believing other tribes are violent 3 0.081 23 0.0000 10 0.730 (0.395)
% saying neighbors are helpful 24 0.0000 48 0.057 (0.314)
% saying town is safe at night 25 0.0000 17 -0.459 (0.318)
% displaced during war 26 0.0000 38 0.133 (0.310)
Collective public goods 27 0.0000 25 0.292 (0.353)
% believing other tribes are dirty 28 0.0000 40 -0.121 (0.382)
Frequency of police/NGO visits 29 0.0000 11 0.717 (0.345)
Has mosque 30 0.0000 23 -0.319 (0.294)
Social services in town 31 0.0000 35 0.161 (0.366)
Mobile phone coverage 32 0.0000 29 0.265 (0.269)
% who rely on government 33 0.0000 24 -0.308 (0.299)
Less than 2 radio stations 34 -0.0001 32 0.225 (0.294)
% of town landless (leaders) 35 -0.0001 5 -1.384 (1.476)
Participation in war violence 36 -0.0001 2 -2.802 (1.315)
% accepting inter-racial marriage 37 -0.0001 30 0.258 (0.338)
Natural resources in 2 hours 38 -0.0001 21 -0.373 (0.295)
% ex-combatants (residents) 39 -0.0001 3 2.292 (1.253)
Town >1 hour from road 40 -0.0001 28 0.274 (0.323)
Unemployment rate 41 -0.0001 56 0.000 (0.331)
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 42 -0.0001 41 -0.112 (0.362)
% affected by crop failure 43 -0.0001 42 -0.107 (0.324)
% affected by human disease 44 -0.0001 53 0.022 (0.285)
% Muslims (residents) 45 -0.0001 27 -0.289 (0.983)
% who rely on NGOs 46 -0.0001 31 -0.230 (0.317)
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.012 47 -0.0001 8 0.756 (0.455)
% male 48 -0.0002 49 -0.048 (0.343)
Perceived equity in institutions 49 -0.0002 14 -0.485 (0.393)
% under 30 50 -0.0002 55 -0.006 (0.312)
% ex-combatants (leaders) 51 -0.0002 1 3.088 (1.344)
% Muslims (leaders) 52 -0.0003 33 -0.198 (1.034)
% non-native (leaders) 53 -0.0003 4 -2.011 (1.209)
% returned from internal displacement 54 -0.0003 44 -0.078 (0.319)
% receiving any peace education 55 -0.0003 46 -0.060 (0.286)
Exposure to war violence 56 -0.0007 6 1.162 (0.437)
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Table A.26: Full risk factor rankings - sorted on logit
Lasso Random forests Logit
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance Rank Coeff. s.e.
% ex-combatants (leaders) 51 -0.0002 1 3.088 (1.344)
Participation in war violence 36 -0.0001 2 -2.802 (1.315)
% ex-combatants (residents) 39 -0.0001 3 2.292 (1.253)
% non-native (leaders) 53 -0.0003 4 -2.011 (1.209)
% of town landless (leaders) 35 -0.0001 5 -1.384 (1.476)
Exposure to war violence 56 -0.0007 6 1.162 (0.437)
% of town farmers 15 0.0001 7 -0.979 (0.443)
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.012 47 -0.0001 8 0.756 (0.455)
Wealth index 13 0.0002 9 0.733 (0.566)
% believing other tribes are violent 3 0.081 23 0.0000 10 0.730 (0.395)
Frequency of police/NGO visits 29 0.0000 11 0.717 (0.345)
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.306 7 0.0004 12 0.691 (0.319)
Commodity price index 21 0.0001 13 0.547 (0.298)
Perceived equity in institutions 49 -0.0002 14 -0.485 (0.393)
% with no education 14 0.0002 15 0.475 (0.950)
% reporting assault 16 0.0001 16 -0.470 (0.392)
% saying town is safe at night 25 0.0000 17 -0.459 (0.318)
% in dominant group 4 -0.048 2 0.0008 18 -0.419 (0.555)
% describing police/courts as corrupt 22 0.0001 19 -0.418 (0.395)
% reporting loss of land during war 8 0.0004 20 -0.380 (0.328)
Natural resources in 2 hours 38 -0.0001 21 -0.373 (0.295)
Group participation (0-9) 12 0.0002 22 0.329 (0.485)
Has mosque 30 0.0000 23 -0.319 (0.294)
% who rely on government 33 0.0000 24 -0.308 (0.299)
Collective public goods 27 0.0000 25 0.292 (0.353)
% reporting any land conflict 11 0.0002 26 0.291 (0.483)
% Muslims (residents) 45 -0.0001 27 -0.289 (0.983)
Town >1 hour from road 40 -0.0001 28 0.274 (0.323)
Mobile phone coverage 32 0.0000 29 0.265 (0.269)
% accepting inter-racial marriage 37 -0.0001 30 0.258 (0.338)
% who rely on NGOs 46 -0.0001 31 -0.230 (0.317)
Less than 2 radio stations 34 -0.0001 32 0.225 (0.294)
% Muslims (leaders) 52 -0.0003 33 -0.198 (1.034)
Police or magistrate in town 17 0.0001 34 -0.167 (0.265)
Social services in town 31 0.0000 35 0.161 (0.366)
% affected by livestock disease 18 0.0001 36 0.150 (0.311)
Any violent event (lagged DV) 19 0.0001 37 0.143 (0.287)
% displaced during war 26 0.0000 38 0.133 (0.310)
% reporting burglary or robbery 9 0.0003 39 0.129 (0.316)
% believing other tribes are dirty 28 0.0000 40 -0.121 (0.382)
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 42 -0.0001 41 -0.112 (0.362)
% affected by crop failure 43 -0.0001 42 -0.107 (0.324)
% of town landless (residents) 20 0.0001 43 -0.100 (0.330)
% returned from internal displacement 54 -0.0003 44 -0.078 (0.319)
% non-native (residents) 10 0.0003 45 -0.074 (0.283)
% receiving any peace education 55 -0.0003 46 -0.060 (0.286)
Town population 2 0.156 1 0.0024 47 -0.058 (0.416)
% saying neighbors are helpful 24 0.0000 48 0.057 (0.314)
% male 48 -0.0002 49 -0.048 (0.343)
# of households 5 0.0005 50 -0.046 (0.352)
Mean educational attainment 3 0.0007 51 0.036 (1.010)
# of tribes 4 0.0006 52 0.029 (0.461)
% affected by human disease 44 -0.0001 53 0.022 (0.285)
S.D. of wealth index in town 6 0.0004 54 0.009 (0.428)
% under 30 50 -0.0002 55 -0.006 (0.312)
Unemployment rate 41 -0.0001 56 0.000 (0.331)
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Risk factor rankings after disaggregating incidents by category
Tables ??, ?? and ?? report risk factor rankings for models trained and tested on each of
our three categories of violence–collective, interpersonal and extrajudicial, respectively. In
general, different categories of violence appear to have different predictors. For example,
proxies for ethnic heterogeneity, polarization and fractionalization tend to predict interper-
sonal violence more accurately than they predict collective or extrajudicial violence, while
estimates for the proportion of residents that fought in the civil war—and, relatedly, the
proportion of residents that self-identify as ex-combatants—predict extrajudicial violence
more accurately than they predict collective or interpersonal violence. Our indicator for
power-sharing is the highest ranked predictor of interpersonal violence in the lasso model,
but does not appear among the top 10 predictors of either collective or extrajudicial violence.
Exposure to disease—an adverse economic shock—is highly ranked in the lasso model for
interpersonal violence as well, but not for collective or extrajudicial violence. Interestingly,
the coefficient on exposure to disease is negative, suggesting that, if anything, shocks of this
sort are associated with less rather than more interpersonal violence.
Some risk factors do, however, recur across models. For example, more agricultural towns
tend to be less susceptible to both collective and extrajudicial violence. Curiously, towns
whose residents perceive the police, courts and local leaders as just are more rather than
less prone to collective violence, and towns whose residents perceive the police and courts
as corrupt tend to be less rather than more prone to extrajudicial violence. This may be
because perceptions of malfeasance are most severe in places where the police and courts are
most active (assuming, of course, that police presence mitigates the risk of violence, which
it may not).
Table A.27: Full risk factor rankings for predicting collective violence
Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Town population 15 0.227 3 0.00030
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Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
# of households 43 0.00000
# of tribes 44 0.00000
% Muslims (leaders) 22 -0.166 10 0.00010
Has mosque 13 -0.299 30 0.00000
% Muslims (residents) 13 0.00010
% non-native (residents) 9 0.434 4 0.00010
% non-native (leaders) 39 0.00000
% in dominant group 49 0.00000
% ex-combatants (residents) 31 0.00000
% ex-combatants (leaders) 53 -0.00010
% returned from internal displacement 55 -0.00010
% under 30 24 -0.126 38 0.00000
% male 42 0.00000
Mean educational attainment 21 0.00000
% with no education 29 0.00000
% receiving any peace education 56 -0.00010
Group participation (0-9) 11 0.349 26 0.00000
% who contribute to public facilities 27 0.00000
% saying town is safe at night 17 -0.181 1 0.00050
% saying neighbors are helpful 51 -0.00010
Collective public goods 29 -0.045 19 0.00000
% who rely on NGOs 6 0.472 6 0.00010
% who rely on government 19 0.173 35 0.00000
Perceived equity in institutions 4 0.578 7 0.00010
% describing police/courts as corrupt 52 -0.00010
% accepting inter-racial marriage 8 0.443 25 0.00000
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 20 -0.169 16 0.00000
% believing other tribes are violent 14 0.288 47 0.00000
% believing other tribes are dirty 45 0.00000
Minority tribe in town leadership 26 0.103 32 0.00000
% reporting burglary or robbery 2 0.632 5 0.00010
% reporting assault 3 -0.583 24 0.00000
% reporting any land conflict 11 0.00010
Any violent event (lagged DV) 18 -0.181 33 0.00000
% of town landless (leaders) 41 0.00000
% of town landless (residents) 23 0.154 17 0.00000
% of town farmers 1 -0.717 8 0.00010
Unemployment rate 16 0.221 9 0.00010
Wealth index 12 -0.323 46 0.00000
S.D. of wealth index in town 31 -0.03 14 0.00010
Exposure to war violence 36 0.00000
Participation in war violence 5 -0.55 28 0.00000
% reporting loss of land during war 28 0.085 22 0.00000
% displaced during war 10 -0.399 2 0.00050
Social services in town 12 0.00010
Police or magistrate in town 25 0.113 48 0.00000
Frequency of police/NGO visits 7 0.454 50 -0.00010
Town >1 hour from road 21 0.167 20 0.00000
Mobile phone coverage 15 0.00000
Less than 2 radio stations 30 -0.04 37 0.00000
Natural resources in 2 hours 54 -0.00010
Commodity price index 34 0.00000
% affected by human disease 27 0.09 18 0.00000
% affected by livestock disease 23 0.00000
% affected by crop failure 40 0.00000
Table A.28: Full risk factor rankings for predicting interpersonal violence
Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Town population 38 0.031 1 0.00250
# of households 3 0.00090
# of tribes 17 0.234 2 0.00090
% Muslims (leaders) 37 0.00000
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Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Has mosque 7 -0.443 30 0.00000
% Muslims (residents) 31 -0.14 46 -0.00010
% non-native (residents) 39 0.017 10 0.00030
% non-native (leaders) 29 0.00000
% in dominant group 12 0.00020
% ex-combatants (residents) 23 0.00010
% ex-combatants (leaders) 40 0.00000
% returned from internal displacement 33 0.08 51 -0.00010
% under 30 19 -0.223 54 -0.00020
% male 38 0.00000
Mean educational attainment 22 0.194 5 0.00070
% with no education 8 0.00040
% receiving any peace education 21 0.195 36 0.00000
Group participation (0-9) 53 -0.00010
% who contribute to public facilities 10 0.381 35 0.00000
% saying town is safe at night 20 -0.2 16 0.00010
% saying neighbors are helpful 23 -0.187 9 0.00040
Collective public goods 30 0.14 32 0.00000
% who rely on NGOs 9 -0.404 14 0.00020
% who rely on government 12 -0.365 55 -0.00020
Perceived equity in institutions 34 -0.077 27 0.00000
% describing police/courts as corrupt 28 -0.146 48 -0.00010
% accepting inter-racial marriage 28 0.00000
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 36 -0.034 31 0.00000
% believing other tribes are violent 27 0.146 15 0.00020
% believing other tribes are dirty 6 0.00060
Minority tribe in town leadership 1 0.682 22 0.00010
% reporting burglary or robbery 25 0.171 11 0.00030
% reporting assault 26 0.00000
% reporting any land conflict 18 0.00010
Any violent event (lagged DV) 6 0.469 21 0.00010
% of town landless (leaders) 52 -0.00010
% of town landless (residents) 44 0.00000
% of town farmers 13 -0.33 17 0.00010
Unemployment rate 29 0.14 43 0.00000
Wealth index 18 0.23 13 0.00020
S.D. of wealth index in town 24 0.174 24 0.00010
Exposure to war violence 4 0.507 56 -0.00040
Participation in war violence 14 -0.294 47 -0.00010
% reporting loss of land during war 40 0.002 4 0.00070
% displaced during war 11 0.378 25 0.00010
Social services in town 26 0.171 7 0.00050
Police or magistrate in town 37 -0.034 20 0.00010
Frequency of police/NGO visits 5 0.498 34 0.00000
Town >1 hour from road 16 -0.246 39 0.00000
Mobile phone coverage 33 0.00000
Less than 2 radio stations 15 0.278 41 0.00000
Natural resources in 2 hours 3 -0.509 45 -0.00010
Commodity price index 8 0.407 19 0.00010
% affected by human disease 2 -0.635 42 0.00000
% affected by livestock disease 32 0.113 50 -0.00010
% affected by crop failure 35 -0.076 49 -0.00010
Table A.29: Full risk factor rankings for predicting ritual violence
Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
Town population 32 0.00000
# of households 53 -0.00010
# of tribes 14 0.00000
% Muslims (leaders) 21 0.00000
Has mosque 22 0.00000
% Muslims (residents) 23 0.00000
% non-native (residents) 7 0.00000
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Lasso Random forests
Risk factor Rank Coeff. Rank Importance
% non-native (leaders) 54 -0.00010
% in dominant group 9 -0.276 41 0.00000
% ex-combatants (residents) 14 0.136 2 0.00010
% ex-combatants (leaders) 29 0.00000
% returned from internal displacement 4 -0.607 46 0.00000
% under 30 3 0.00010
% male 37 0.00000
Mean educational attainment 9 0.00000
% with no education 10 0.00000
% receiving any peace education 6 -0.48 55 -0.00010
Group participation (0-9) 43 0.00000
% who contribute to public facilities 5 0.524 34 0.00000
% saying town is safe at night 20 -0.002 40 0.00000
% saying neighbors are helpful 15 0.00000
Collective public goods 4 0.00000
% who rely on NGOs 56 -0.00010
% who rely on government 12 0.179 42 0.00000
Perceived equity in institutions 17 0.084 6 0.00000
% describing police/courts as corrupt 3 -0.628 12 0.00000
% accepting inter-racial marriage 18 0.078 17 0.00000
% who say Muslims shouldn’t be leaders 15 0.118 44 0.00000
% believing other tribes are violent 39 0.00000
% believing other tribes are dirty 28 0.00000
Minority tribe in town leadership 24 0.00000
% reporting burglary or robbery 36 0.00000
% reporting assault 45 0.00000
% reporting any land conflict 50 0.00000
Any violent event (lagged DV) 25 0.00000
% of town landless (leaders) 47 0.00000
% of town landless (residents) 30 0.00000
% of town farmers 2 -0.654 49 0.00000
Unemployment rate 1 -0.841 26 0.00000
Wealth index 16 0.116 35 0.00000
S.D. of wealth index in town 10 0.27 51 0.00000
Exposure to war violence 5 0.00000
Participation in war violence 13 0.163 1 0.00040
% reporting loss of land during war 19 -0.01 20 0.00000
% displaced during war 31 0.00000
Social services in town 48 0.00000
Police or magistrate in town 33 0.00000
Frequency of police/NGO visits 19 0.00000
Town >1 hour from road 7 0.464 13 0.00000
Mobile phone coverage 27 0.00000
Less than 2 radio stations 38 0.00000
Natural resources in 2 hours 11 0.00000
Commodity price index 8 0.443 16 0.00000
% affected by human disease 11 0.238 18 0.00000
% affected by livestock disease 8 0.00000
% affected by crop failure 52 -0.00010
Using predictors of one category of violence to predict the others
??If different categories of violence have similar predictors, then it should be possible to
forecast one category reasonably accurately using the same risk factors and model parameters
used to forecast the others. We consider two approaches to testing this proposition: first,
using models trained on one category of violence to predict each of the others, and second,
using models trained on two categories of violence to predict the third.
Tables ??, ??, and ?? report performance metrics for the first approach. Not surprisingly,
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Table A.30: Performance metrics for models trained on collective violence and tested on
other categories
(a) Cross-validated forecasts for models trained on collective violence
Interpersonal Extrajudicial
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.55
Brier score 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.05
True positives (sensitivity) 57% 55% 54% 41% 46% 42%
True negatives (specificity) 51% 50% 51% 49% 49% 50%
Overall accuracy 51% 51% 51% 49% 49% 49%
Ratio of false + to true + 5.79 6.06 6.13 40.56 34.85 39.89
Ratio of false - to true + 0.79 0.84 0.89 1.74 1.34 1.71
(b) True forecasts for models trained on collective violence
Interpersonal Extrajudicial
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.65 0.51 0.53 0.67 0.48 0.60
Brier score 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07
True positives (sensitivity) 81% 81% 52% 75% 81% 56%
True negatives (specificity) 47% 24% 56% 46% 24% 56%
Overall accuracy 50% 29% 55% 48% 28% 56%
Ratio of false + to true + 6.88 9.82 8.91 10.17 13.15 11.11
Ratio of false - to true + 0.24 0.24 0.91 0.33 0.23 0.78
the models generally (though not universally) perform better when they are trained and
tested on the same dependent variable than when they are trained on one and tested on the
others. These results are unstable, however, and should be interpreted with caution.
Table ?? reports performance metrics for the second approach. Again, the models gener-
ally (though not universally) perform better when they are trained and tested on the same
dependent variable than when they are trained on two and tested on the third. More sur-
prisingly, however, the models are reasonably accurate—and almost uniformly better than
chance—even when predicting across categories, and the differences between within- and
cross-category performance are in many cases small. This is especially true when we train
our models on two categories of violence and test them on the third. Outside the realm of
forecasting, many studies implicitly assume that different categories of violence are distinct,
and restrict their analyses to one at a time.
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Table A.31: Performance metrics for models trained on one category of local violence and
tested on each of the others
(a) Cross-validated forecasts for models trained on interpersonal violence
Collective Extrajudicial
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.53
Brier score 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.11
True positives (sensitivity) 64% 61% 64% 59% 52% 52%
True negatives (specificity) 37% 47% 43% 37% 47% 42%
Overall accuracy 38% 48% 43% 37% 47% 42%
Ratio of false + to true + 25.53 22.73 23.40 32.47 31.92 33.76
Ratio of false - to true + 0.56 0.67 0.58 0.76 1.06 1.00
(b) True forecasts for models trained on interpersonal violence
Collective Extrajudicial
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.46 0.71 0.63 0.39 0.54 0.59
Brier score 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.13
True positives (sensitivity) 71% 86% 86% 44% 44% 38%
True negatives (specificity) 34% 34% 46% 32% 32% 43%
Overall accuracy 35% 36% 47% 33% 33% 43%
Ratio of false + to true + 31.20 25.67 21.33 22.00 21.86 21.33
Ratio of false - to true + 0.40 0.17 0.17 1.29 1.29 1.67
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Table A.32: Performance metrics for models trained on extrajudicial violence and tested on
other categories
(a) Cross-validated forecasts for models trained on extrajudicial violence
Collective Interpersonal
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.52
Brier score 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.13
True positives (sensitivity) 47% 53% 46% 55% 50% 48%
True negatives (specificity) 46% 52% 52% 46% 52% 52%
Overall accuracy 46% 52% 52% 47% 51% 52%
Ratio of false + to true + 31.91 25.40 29.17 6.53 6.46 6.60
Ratio of false - to true + 1.28 1.03 1.34 0.85 1.04 1.10
(b) True forecasts for models trained on extrajudicial violence
Collective Interpersonal
Performance metric Lasso RF NN Lasso RF NN
AUC 0.54 0.77 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.54
Brier score 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.09
True positives (sensitivity) 71% 57% 29% 71% 67% 38%
True negatives (specificity) 43% 22% 54% 44% 21% 54%
Overall accuracy 44% 23% 53% 46% 25% 52%
Ratio of false + to true + 26.80 46.00 54.00 8.27 12.43 12.75
Ratio of false - to true + 0.40 0.75 2.50 0.40 0.50 1.63
lviii
Our results, while ambiguous, suggest at the very least that these distinctions should be
treated not as an assumption, but rather as a hypothesis to be tested.
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